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ABSTRACT—Prisoners’ rights to bodily privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment are limited, allowing detention officials to strip-search them for 
contraband. The extent to which the Fourth Amendment protects prisoners, 
however, is uncertain. Questions regarding whether strip searches require 
reasonable suspicion and the manner in which officials may conduct strip 
searches have troubled courts for decades. In the absence of clear guidance 
from the Supreme Court, courts have reached inconsistent conclusions, 
imperiling the human rights and dignity of prisoners. This Note argues that 
courts should define and apply prisoners’ rights to bodily privacy with 
reference to international human-rights law, specifically the United Nations 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. By looking to this 
standard, courts can define the right to bodily privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment in a manner that aligns with the informed and carefully debated 
consensus of nations, moving away from the inconsistent decision-making 
of the lower courts that has failed to produce any cognizable doctrine. 
Resolving this uncertainty will not only allow for greater doctrinal clarity in 
this area of law, but also bolster the human rights and basic dignity of 
prisoners as guaranteed to them by the Constitution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Roughly five years ago, Deanna Jones was arrested for credit-card 
fraud.1 Following Jones’s arrest, officials took her to Burlington County 
Detention Center, where she underwent a strip search.2 Officers directed 
Jones, who was completely naked throughout the search, to bend over, 
expose her breasts and genitals for inspection, and cough.3 They then sent 
her to another facility where officials strip-searched her again.4 Soon after, 
she was released and the charges were dropped.5 Subsequently, Jones filed 
suit against the detention centers and officers who had conducted the strip 
searches for violating her Fourth Amendment right to bodily privacy.6 But 
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey rejected her 
claim, holding that strip-searching detainees is constitutional because 
detainees may pose a security risk by bringing contraband into a detention 
facility, even when they are arrested on minor charges and prison officials 
lack reasonable suspicion. 7  This troubling decision adds to the murky, 
 
 1 Jones v. Burlington Township, No. 1:17-cv-01871-NLH-AMD, 2017 WL 6372232, at *1–2 (D.N.J. 
Dec. 13, 2017). 
 2 Id. at *2. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. at *4–5, *8. 
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unsettled debate surrounding prisoners’ Fourth Amendment right to bodily 
privacy.8 
The problem stems from the great uncertainty among circuits regarding 
the extent to which the Fourth Amendment protects prisoners from strip 
searches.9 A “strip search” refers to the search of a person’s body in a state 
of partial or full undress.10 Such searches can be merely visual, with an 
officer observing a detainee’s body for contraband, or more intrusive, if they 
include the inspection of body cavities (i.e., genital and rectal areas).11 In the 
past forty years, the Supreme Court has only decided two cases on this topic 
and both times produced narrow holdings.12 Lower courts note that these 
decisions offer little guidance on how to navigate more difficult cases13 and 
that “[t]he law governing . . . [strip] searches is far from settled; the rules 
alter with circumstances, and the circumstances are myriad.”14 In the absence 
of clear guidance from the Supreme Court regarding strip searches, courts 
often reach contradictory conclusions on the same set of facts—sometimes 
 
 8 See, e.g., Gabriel M. Helmer, Note, Strip Search and the Felony Detainee: A Case for Reasonable 
Suspicion, 81 B.U. L. REV. 239, 242 (2001) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s “minimal guidance to 
lower courts” on the proper application of its rulings has made unclear the extent of the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection for prisoners against strip searches); Julian Ellis, Comment, Florence v. Board 
of Chosen Freeholders: The Resurrection of Bell v. Wolfish and the Questions to Follow, 90 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 559, 559 (2012) (contending that the Court’s refusal to create a consistent, defined factor test for 
evaluating the constitutionality of strip searches “provides little guidance to circuit courts”). 
 9  This Note uses “prisoner” and “detainee” as all-encompassing terms for any person held in 
detention by the criminal justice system for any period of time and for any offense. Such use is consistent 
with the broad language used by the Supreme Court in relevant opinions. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 
441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979) (referencing both “prisoners” and “detainees”). 
 10 William J. Simonitsch, Visual Body Cavity Searches Incident to Arrest: Validity Under the Fourth 
Amendment, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 665, 66768 (2000) (noting that some courts use the term “strip search” 
to refer to both the viewing of an undressed person as well as the visual inspection of genital and rectal 
areas). 
 11 Id. Simonitsch uses “body cavity search” as an umbrella term and makes a distinction between 
strip searches and visual body-cavity searches. Id. This Note, by contrast, uses “strip search” as an 
umbrella term. 
 12 Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 338–39 (2012) (finding constitutional the 
suspicionless strip search of a misdemeanor arrestee in a detention facility before officials admitted him 
into the general population); Bell, 441 U.S. at 558 (upholding a prison’s blanket policy of strip-searching 
pretrial felony detainees following visits during which they could have obtained contraband). For analysis 
of why these holdings are narrow and may apply only in the precise factual circumstances addressed, see 
infra Sections I.A., I.C. 
 13 See, e.g., United States v. Perez, No. 17-10391-RGS, 2019 WL 181283, at *5 n.5 (D. Mass. Jan. 
11, 2019); Brownell v. Montoya, No. 11-0979 MV/GBW, 2013 WL 12334217, at *17 (D.N.M. Mar. 28, 
2013); Ford v. City of Boston, 154 F. Supp. 2d 131, 140 (D. Mass. 2001). 
 14 Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 158 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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finding strip searches unreasonable when conducted in a nonprivate setting15 
and other times justifying similarly nonprivate group searches for reasons of 
expediency.16 Prison administrators are similarly impeded by uncertainty as 
to whether, when, and how they can strip-search detainees. 17  This 
“inconsistent . . . analytic framework”18—in the words of one court—poses 
a practical problem from a doctrinal perspective. 
The extreme intrusion of privacy a strip search constitutes underscores 
the severity of this problem. Strip-search survivors do not suffer a merely 
abstract harm but rather a cognizable physical and psychological injury. 
Victims of such searches have described them as “sexually degrading,” 
“inhumane,” and akin “to a forced self-rape act.” 19  Searches are so 
humiliating that survivors even refuse visits from their own children and 
attorneys to avoid having to strip before prison officials before or after the 
meeting. 20  The resulting trauma has forced survivors into treatment for 
suicidal depression, triggered memories of past sexual and physical abuse, 
and interfered with their ability to advocate for themselves at parole hearings 
and in mandatory reentry programs, impeding their release from 
incarceration. 21  Many suffer a level of trauma similar to that of rape 
survivors, regardless of whether they are recent arrestees or long-term 
inmates.22 
 
 15 See, e.g., Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 573–74 (6th Cir. 2013) (finding strip 
search of a detainee unreasonable in part because it was conducted in a public setting); Lopez v. 
Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 113840 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that a facility’s blanket policy of 
group strip searches violates the Fourth Amendment). 
 16 See, e.g., Sumpter v. Wayne County, 868 F.3d 473, 48485 (6th Cir. 2017) (upholding a facility’s 
practice of strip-searching five prisoners at a time because of the expediency offered by a group search); 
Lewis v. Sec’y of Pub. Safety & Corr., 870 F.3d 365, 368–69 (5th Cir. 2017) (finding reasonable a group 
strip search of ten prisoners at once). 
 17 See, e.g., Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 488 (granting qualified immunity to a prison official who executed 
a strip search because the law was unclear regarding whether group strip searches are unreasonable, so 
“no reasonable officer would have known” how to proceed); Holland v. City of New York, 197 F. Supp. 
3d 529, 54445 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (granting qualified immunity to a prison official who conducted a cross-
gender strip search because the law in both the Second Circuit and elsewhere is unclear and unsettled 
regarding this issue). 
 18 Ford, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 140. 
 19  Invasive Search, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/invasive-search [https://perma.cc/ZJG6-W454] 
(quoting inmates at Michigan’s Women’s Huron Valley Correctional Facility); see also Kelleher v. N.Y. 
State Trooper Fearon, 90 F. Supp. 2d 354, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (observing that an arrestee testified to 
feeling “violated,” “humiliated,” and “scared” after a strip search). 
 20 Michelle VanNatta, Conceptualizing and Stopping State Sexual Violence Against Incarcerated 
Women, 37 SOC. JUST. 27, 34 (2010). 
 21 Invasive Search, supra note 19. 
 22 Daphne Ha, Note, Blanket Policies for Strip Searching Pretrial Detainees: An Interdisciplinary 
Argument for Reasonableness, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2721, 2740–41 (2011). Prisoners have felt that strip 
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Certain factors can further exacerbate the trauma associated with strip 
searches. For instance, nonprivate searches—those occurring in view of 
other prisoners or more guards than necessary—deepen the violative 
exposure and humiliation felt by victims.23 Gender also necessarily affects a 
victim’s feelings regarding a search—female prisoners often find such 
searches more harmful than their male counterparts.24 Detainees who are 
lactating25 or menstruating26 during a search may also be more impacted. In 
a particularly egregious example, menstruating inmates were forced to strip 
as a group before male guards during a training exercise.27 Guards forced the 
inmates to remove all tampons and sanitary pads without offering any 
replacements, leaving the inmates to stand barefoot and bleeding out on the 
floor while the officers yelled numerous derogatory and abusive comments 
at them.28 Finally, trans women may also find such searches particularly 
traumatic because of the resultant exposure of their genital characteristics 
and the potential for guards to use such searches to harass them.29 
The Supreme Court is not unaware of these physical and psychological 
harms: one Justice has noted how strip searches force inmates into “the most 
degrading position possible” and heighten their fear of physical abuse and 
sexual assault.30 Lower courts too have acknowledged the deeply invasive31 
 
searches were “increasingly hard to bear” and were “conducted with unnecessary disregard for personal 
dignity.” RUSSELL P. DOBASH, R. EMERSON DOBASH & SUE GUTTERIDGE, THE IMPRISONMENT OF 
WOMEN 204 (1986). 
 23  Sumpter v. Wayne County, 868 F.3d 473, 483 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Intrusive under ideal 
circumstances, strip searches are especially humiliating when they are conducted in front of other 
inmates.”); Williams v. City of Cleveland, 771 F.3d 945, 953 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The wider an audience for 
a strip search, the more humiliating it becomes, especially when the stripped individual is exposed to 
bystanders who do not share the searching officers’ institutional need to view her unclothed.”). 
 24  Margo Schlanger, Jail Strip-Search Cases: Patterns and Participants, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 65, 7576 (2008). 
 25 In one such scenario, a female detainee began lactating during the strip search and was disallowed 
from covering herself, while a male jailer gave her a cut maxi pad. Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278, 
1282 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 26 Brief for Sister Bernie Galvin et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1112, Florence v. 
Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318 (2012) (No. 10-945) (detailing traumatic experience of female 
student who was menstruating during a strip search). 
 27 Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769, 77475 (7th Cir. 2020). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Kyle Kirkup, Indocile Bodies: Gender Identity and Strip Searches in Canadian Criminal Law, 
24 CANADIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 107, 107 (2009); NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., LGBTQ PEOPLE 
BEHIND BARS: A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES FACING TRANSGENDER PRISONERS AND THEIR 
LEGAL RIGHTS 15 (2018). 
 30 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 577–78 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 31 Wood v. Clemons, 89 F.3d 922, 928 (1st Cir. 1996). 
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and humiliating nature of strip searches, 32  deeming the procedures 
“demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, . . . terrifying, unpleasant, 
embarrassing, repulsive, signifying degradation and submission.” 33  The 
severe health impact of strip searches underscores the need to determine the 
extent of the Fourth Amendment’s protections against them. 
In addition to the consequences of strip searches, prisoners suffer harm 
from the uncertainty of the state of the law. The Supreme Court has stated 
that “[p]risoners retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all 
persons.” 34  To abide by this would require recognizing the impact that 
inconsistent strip searches have on prisoners’ dignity. Whether a detainee 
will be stripped naked and invasively searched or not owes often to 
circumstantial procedural differences in their conditions—such as whether 
one is being held in the general prison population or at a police station.35 As 
one court has explained, “Strip search litigation in general is inherently risky 
because of the deference given jail officials, because a split in circuits has 
developed, and because the case law that does exist is not directly on point.”36 
In the absence of a coherent doctrine governing the reasonability of strip 
searches, prisoners will continuously be left in the lurch about their “most 
personal and deep-rooted expectation[] of privacy”—privacy in their 
bodies.37 A clear doctrine regarding strip searches would allow courts to 
resolve cases more consistently, enable prisoners to be on notice of their 
rights, and require prison administrators to be aware of their responsibilities. 
To resolve the debate regarding strip searches, this Note proposes 
defining and applying the right to bodily privacy for prisoners with reference 
to international human-rights law, specifically the United Nations (UN) 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (SMRs). 38  In 
contrast to the current regime, the SMRs provide standards fashioned by 
vigorous cross-cultural debate for how and when to carry out strip searches. 
 
 32 Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 572–73 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 33 Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F. Supp. 486, 491 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (quoting Transcript of Oral Opinion at 
715(a), 717(a), 719(a), Sala v. County of Suffolk, 604 F.2d 207 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (No. 75-CV-486)), aff’d, 
620 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1980). “This language describing strip and visual body cavity searches was 
repeated in Tinetti and has become the standard description adopted by most courts.” Howard Friedman 
& Robert Rufo, Strip Searches and the Fourth Amendment Rights of Prisoners 3 (Apr. 21, 2004) 
(unpublished manuscript), 2004 WL 2800491, at *6. 
 34 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011). 
 35 See Fate v. Charles, 24 F. Supp. 3d 337, 350–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 36 Lopez v. Youngblood, No. CV-F-07-0474 DLB, 2011 WL 10483569, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 
2011). 
 37 Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013) (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 
(1985)). 
 38 G.A. Res. 70/175 (Jan. 8, 2015). 
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Courts should interpret the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protections in 
light of the SMRs because they reflect international consensus on a topic of 
grave importance where domestic jurisprudence has failed to resolve the 
debate.39 When domestic jurisprudence has failed, international law (such as 
the SMRs) can provide insight through authorities that “by years of labor, 
research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted 
with the subjects of which they treat.”40 This Note’s analysis of the right to 
bodily privacy is grounded in U.S. constitutional law but draws on 
nonbinding international law to help guide its interpretationa practice not 
without precedent in the Supreme Court and other federal courts.41 
This Note is the first piece of scholarship to propose interpreting the 
Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches in light of the 
SMRs. Scholars have previously explored the application of the SMRs to 
domestic jurisprudence, but have focused on the Eighth Amendment’s 
protection against cruel and unusual punishment. 42  Such scholars have 
recognized the persuasive weight of the SMRs and encouraged domestic 
courts to follow the their guidance when determining how the Eighth 
Amendment’s protections apply to prisoners.43 No scholar has yet suggested 
using the SMRs to steer the application of the Fourth Amendment in prison.44 
 
 39 See Rex D. Glensy, The Use of International Law in U.S. Constitutional Adjudication, 25 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 197, 206 (2011) (explaining that “the practices of countries which repeatedly interact with 
one another will increasingly grow more convergent until eventually they reach a level of basic uniformity 
that gives rise to an implicit acknowledgement that such practice has to be followed out of a sense of legal 
requirement,” which is international customary law). The SMRs are an example of such international 
customary law. See HUMAN RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 115 (Albert P. Blaustein, Roger S. Clark & Jay A. 
Sigler eds., 1987). 
 40 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
 41 See infra notes 228–237 and accompanying text. 
 42 See, e.g., Nan D. Miller, Comment, International Protection of the Rights of Prisoners: Is Solitary 
Confinement in the United States a Violation of International Standards?, 26 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 139, 
168, 171 (1995) (arguing that U.S. courts should find solitary confinement to violate the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment because of the SMRs’ disapproval of the practice); 
Susanna Y. Chung, Prison Overcrowding: Standards in Determining Eighth Amendment Violations, 
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2351, 2391 (2000) (contending that the SMRs “may aid in interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment because they provide a more comprehensive understanding of the contemporary standard of 
decency”); Amanda Dick, The Immature State of Our Union: Lack of Legal Entitlement to Prison 
Programming in the United States as Compared to European Countries, 35 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 
287, 317 (2018) (arguing that the Supreme Court should fashion a standard for the Eighth Amendment 
“more consistent with today’s international norms on penal justice, which are reflected in the UN’s 
adoption of the Standard Minimum Rules”). 
 43 See Miller, supra note 42, at 147–48, 167–68. 
 44 The closest is a student note observing in a brief aside that “a compelling argument can be made 
on the basis of international law” to stop cross-gender pat (not strip) searches of inmates. Robyn 
Gallagher, Note, Constitutional Law—Cross-Gender Pat Searches: The Battle Between Inmates and 
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This may owe to the fact that the original SMRs in 1957 and 1977 did not 
include a rule regarding strip searches,45 but the revised 2015 version does.46 
Notably, even post-2015 scholarship on the use of the SMRs in domestic 
constitutional interpretation has continued to focus on their applicability to 
the Eighth Amendment.47 This Note advances the scholarly conversation by 
importing the use of the SMRs to interpret the Eighth Amendment in a 
related but novel context—the Fourth Amendment sphere of jurisprudence. 
Part I of this Note outlines the historical development of the right to 
bodily privacy, progressing from the Supreme Court’s first discussion of the 
constitutionality of strip-searching prisoners in Bell v. Wolfish, 48  the 
uncertainty among federal courts for over thirty years following Bell, the 
Court’s unsuccessful attempt to resolve the uncertainty in Florence v. Board 
of Chosen Freeholders in 2012,49 and the current state of the law. It describes 
how the Court’s decision in Florence has only produced further uncertainty 
in the lower courts, which have granted detention centers essentially carte 
blanche to conduct such searches, leading to controversial decisions such as 
that in Deanna Jones’s case.50 
Part II then explores solutions others have recommended in response to 
the Court’s failure to explicate a clear doctrine regarding strip searches, and 
it explains why these may fail to persuade the Court. Scholars want the Court 
to require individualized, reasonable suspicion for strip searches and offer 
varying reasons why the Court should do so, but these rationales by 
themselves may not provide sufficient support. International consensus, 
however, provides a greater weight of authority that this Note suggests can 
be used to more thoroughly tip the balance in favor of adopting a reasonable 
suspicion standard. Part II also posits that the inexorable entanglement of the 
Fourth Amendment with a fundamental human right (here, bodily privacy) 
makes it ripe for contextualization and development within the international 
norm. 
 
Corrections Officers Enters the Courtroom, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 567, 598 n.224 (2011). This point 
owes to the original SMRs’ disapproval of cross-gender supervision of prisoners. Id. 
 45 See G.A. Res. 663 C (XXIV) (July 31, 1957); G.A. Res. 2076 (LXII) (May 13, 1977). 
 46  See G.A. Res. 70/175, supra note 38, at 18–19; UN Launches ‘Nelson Mandela Rules’ on 
Improving Treatment of Prisoners, UNITED NATIONS (Oct. 7, 2015), 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/10/511912-un-launches-nelson-mandela-rules-improving-treatment-
prisoners [https://perma.cc/666N-9AJH]. 
 47 See, e.g., Dick, supra note 42, at 317; Federica Coppola, The Brain in Solitude: An (Other) Eighth 
Amendment Challenge to Solitary Confinement, 6 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 184, 224 (2019). 
 48 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979). 
 49 566 U.S. 318, 338–39 (2012). 
 50 Jones v. Burlington Township, No. 1:17-cv-01871-NLH-AMD, 2017 WL 6372232, at *8 (D.N.J. 
Dec. 13, 2017) (relying on Florence to dismiss Jones’s complaint). 
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Part III proposes a novel solution using the international norm—
creating a coherent doctrine around strip searches in prisons by looking to 
standards of international human-rights law, specifically the SMRs. It begins 
by explaining why this practice is advisable and supported by robust 
domestic precedent. As an exemplar of international customary law,51 the 
SMRs serve as persuasive authority to U.S. federal courts.52 The Supreme 
Court has previously used international customary law, including the SMRs, 
to help interpret the extent of protection offered by the Eighth Amendment53 
and would be well advised to do the same with strip searches under the 
Fourth Amendment. This Note then responds to and refutes commonly posed 
counterarguments to the use of international law in domestic jurisprudence 
and, more specifically, as a tool of constitutional interpretation. 
Finally, Part III sets out how to use the SMRs’ Rule 52 to guide the 
application of the Fourth Amendment in prison.54 This Note examines three 
of these requirements: (1) conducting strip searches only where absolutely 
necessary, (2) using alternatives to strip searches wherever possible, and 
(3) only conducting strip searches in private. The proposed standards are 
easily applicable in the domestic context and lower courts can use them to 
resolve the uncertainty regarding what level of bodily privacy prisoners can 
expect. Resolving this uncertainty will not only allow for greater doctrinal 
clarity in this area of law but will also bolster the human rights and basic 
dignity of prisoners as guaranteed by the Constitution. 
I. THE HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN PRISON 
This Part details the development of the legal standard surrounding strip 
searches in prison, beginning with the Supreme Court’s holding in Bell v. 
Wolfish, which failed to explicate what level of cause is necessary before 
conducting a search. This Part then follows how this narrow ruling led to a 
great deal of confusion in lower courts, which in turn produced a circuit split 
over the level of cause justifying a search. The Court attempted to resolve 
this split in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders but once again failed 
to produce a cognizable standard for courts to determine the constitutionality 
of any given strip search, leading to even further confusion. 
 
 51 HUMAN RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 39, at 115. 
 52 See supra note 42. 
 53 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 n.8 (1976). In this case, the Court held that “deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners . . . [is] proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 
104. The Court found such indifference to contradict agreed-upon standards of decency like those found 
in the SMRs. Id. at 104 n.8. 
 54 G.A. Res. 70/175, supra note 38, at 18–19. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1746 
A. Bell v. Wolfish and Suspicionless Strip Searches 
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure 
in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches” by the government.55 The 
Amendment usually requires a showing of probable cause before a search 
can be conducted.56 However, the Court has found exceptions to this general 
requirement,57 including for searches conducted in prison. The government’s 
compelling interest in promoting safety in prison, “a unique place fraught 
with serious security dangers,” 58  renders, for example, searches of an 
inmate’s cell categorically reasonable.59 
In Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court directly addressed the 
constitutionality of strip searches in prison for the first time. 60  In Bell, 
detainees at the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) in New York City 
claimed that a blanket policy requiring them to undergo a body-cavity search 
every time they returned from a contact visit violated their Fourth 
Amendment right to bodily privacy.61 The Court upheld the policy, stating 
that the Fourth Amendment requires only that a strip search be reasonable, 
which is determined by balancing the facility’s security interest in the search 
(i.e., its interest in preventing the smuggling in of contraband like money, 
drugs, and weapons) against the privacy interest of the prisoner.62 A four-
factor test guides the balancing analysis: (1) “the scope of the particular 
intrusion,” (2) “the manner in which it is conducted,” (3) “the justification 
for initiating it,” and (4) “the place in which it is conducted.”63 
 
 55 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 56 Id. (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
 57 See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (doing away with probable-cause 
requirements for consent searches); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (finding stop-and-frisk searches 
to not require a showing of probable cause). 
 58 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). 
 59 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527–28 (1984). 
 60 441 U.S. at 558. 
 61 Id. A contact visit allows “visitors and inmates to have a limited degree of contact without a glass-
barrier.” ACLU NAT’L PRISON PROJECT, KNOW YOUR RIGHTS: RESTRICTIONS ON VISITATION 2 (2005), 
https://www.acluok.org/sites/default/files/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Know-Your-Rights-
Restrictions-On-Visitation.pdf [https://perma.cc/WH3P-278Q]. 
 62 Bell, 441 U.S. at 558–59. 
 63 Id. at 559. Despite announcing this multifactor test, the Court did not actually discuss how the 
first, second, or fourth factors applied to the particular case. At best, the majority opinion did note that an 
abusive search would be unreasonable. Id. at 560. The abusive nature of a search is likely tied up with the 
“scope” and “manner” of the intrusion, so this may have been where the Court was inviting such analysis. 
See Helmer, supra note 8, at 261. 
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The Court did not impose a specific standard for justification under the 
third factor, instead merely finding that a strip search in the circumstances 
presented (i.e., involving detainees returning from a contact visit) could “be 
conducted on less than probable cause.” 64  In a separate opinion, Justice 
Lewis Powell noted the majority’s omission and argued for the use of 
reasonable suspicion.65 Reasonable suspicion is a lower evidentiary standard 
than probable cause,66 but it still requires a showing of specific, articulable 
facts suggesting “that criminal activity may be afoot.”67 
Some scholars interpret Justice Powell’s separate opinion regarding a 
showing of cause as proof that the majority never thought such a showing 
was necessary.68 Therefore, these scholars read Bell as broadly sanctioning 
strip searches conducted without any substantial showing of cause.69 Other 
scholars, however, agree with Justice Powell that individualized, reasonable 
suspicion is necessary, concluding that the limiting language of the majority 
opinion “suggests that the Court . . . was staking out a small area of exception 
to the general requirement of individualized suspicion. That is, in a narrow 
class of detainees—those in transition back from contact visits—prison 
authorities could dispense with the usual requirements of individualized 
suspicion.”70 Finally, scholars who read Bell narrowly argue that because 
reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause, Justice 
Powell’s opinion is consistent with the majority’s statement that searches can 
sometimes “be conducted on less than probable cause.”71 
 
 64 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 558–60. 
 65 Id. at 563 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“[S]ome level of cause, such as a 
reasonable suspicion, should be required.”). 
 66 See Spear v. Sowders, 71 F.3d 626, 631 (6th Cir. 1995) (“Reasonable suspicion does not mean 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, or by clear and convincing evidence, or even by a preponderance of 
the evidence. Reasonable suspicion is not even equal to a finding of probable cause. Rather, reasonable 
suspicion requires only specific objective facts upon which a prudent official, in light of his experience, 
would conclude that illicit activity might be in progress.”). 
 67 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). In Terry, which concerned reasonable suspicion on a 
public street, the specific, articulable facts that suggested “that criminal activity may be afoot” included 
three people speaking to one another while walking up and down a street repeatedly and glancing into a 
store window. See id. at 6. 
 68  See, e.g., Deborah L. MacGregor, Stripped of All Reason? The Appropriate Standard for 
Evaluating Strip Searches of Arrestees and Pretrial Detainees in Correctional Facilities, 36 COLUM. J.L. 
& SOC. PROBS. 163, 172 (2003). 
 69 See Christopher P. Keleher, Judges as Jailers: The Dangerous Disconnect Between Courts and 
Corrections, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 87, 93 (2011); see also Ellis, supra note 8, at 580 (arguing that Bell 
does not require reasonable suspicion to justify strip searches). 
 70  Julian Simcock, Florence, Atwater, and the Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protections for 
Arrestees, 65 STAN. L. REV. 599, 619 (2013). 
 71  David M. Shapiro, Does the Fourth Amendment Permit Indiscriminate Strip Searches of 
Misdemeanor Arrestees? Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 131, 137 
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For all those not returning from contact visits, however, is reasonable 
suspicion still required? Or, because of the nature of detention, is no showing 
of cause required? The majority opinion did not answer such questions, only 
holding that strip searches are not facially unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment and that the strip-search policy in the context presented was 
constitutionally permissible.72 Such a narrow holding, however, left lower 
courts with little guidance as to what level of cause makes a strip search 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.73 
B. Uncertainty Among the Circuits 
After Bell, the circuits struggled to understand what level of suspicion 
the Constitution required prison officials to hold before conducting a strip 
search. The Court in Bell had addressed only searches of pretrial detainees 
following contact visits during which they could have obtained contraband.74 
The danger raised by contact with the outside world underlaid the suspicion 
justifying the search.75 Lower courts, however, were unsure how to extend 
Bell’s logic to cases where, for example, detainees had committed lesser 
offenses or had recently been arrested and therefore were less likely to have 
contraband on their person. 76  “Much of the current confusion over the 
measures of the due process rights of pretrial detainees,” one court opined, 
“stems from the divergent ways in which lower courts have applied Bell.”77 
The means by which lower courts distinguished Bell varied. Some 
courts adopted a felony-versus-misdemeanor distinction, not allowing 
invasive searches when detainees faced misdemeanor charges.78 Such courts 
determined that the lower risk posed by minor offenders reduced the 
governmental need to conduct the search, thereby tipping the balance in 
 
(2011) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979)); see also Tracy McMath, Comment, Do 
Prison Inmates Retain Any Fourth Amendment Protection from Body Cavity Searches?, 56 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 739, 745–46 (1987) (arguing that Bell “should not be read so broadly as to deny all challenges to 
body cavity searches”). 
 72 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 560. 
 73 Helmer, supra note 8, at 262. 
 74 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 558. 
 75 See id. 
 76 See infra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. 
 77 Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 78  See, e.g., Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 112–13 (1st Cir. 2001) (disallowing a 
suspicionless search of a misdemeanor arrestee under the Fourth Amendment); Wachtler v. County of 
Herkimer, 35 F.3d 77, 81–82 (2d Cir. 1994) (same); Stewart v. Lubbock County, 767 F.2d 153, 156–57 
(5th Cir. 1985) (same); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394 (10th Cir. 1984) (same). 
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favor of protecting the plaintiffs from such a severe invasion of privacy.79 
Other courts refused to uphold suspicionless searches immediately following 
arrest because of the low likelihood that a suspect would attempt to conceal 
contraband while in handcuffed custody as opposed to a contact visit when 
an inmate could have planned specifically to obtain contraband.80 Over time, 
the majority of circuit courts—the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits—read Bell to require individualized, 
reasonable suspicion before conducting a search.81 In contrast, the Third, 
Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits read Bell as holding all blanket strip-
search policies constitutional.82 
The Court left lower courts bereft of guidance on how to apply the 
commands of the Constitution.83 Finally, after the Third Circuit held that 
blanket strip-search policies were constitutional in Florence v. Board of 
Chosen Freeholders,84 the Court agreed to resolve thirty years of confusion.85 
C. Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders: The Supreme Court  
Speaks Again 
In Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, the Court aimed to resolve 
the dispute regarding the extent to which the Fourth Amendment protects 
 
 79 See, e.g., Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that, in 
the cases of “minor offenders,” the need for body-cavity searches was not “substantial enough . . . to 
justify the severity of the governmental intrusion” they entail). 
 80 See, e.g., Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2001) (“It is far less obvious that misdemeanor 
arrestees frequently or even occasionally hide contraband in their bodily orifices. Unlike persons already 
in jail who receive contact visits, arrestees do not ordinarily have notice that they are about to be arrested 
and thus an opportunity to hide something.”); Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(“Visitors to the detention facility in Bell could plan their visits and organize their smuggling activities. 
In contrast, arrest and confinement . . . are unplanned events.”); Thompson v. County of Cook, 412 F. 
Supp. 2d 881, 890 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“[I]t is a relatively safe assumption . . . that only a negligible portion 
of arrestees have concealed contraband in body cavities prior to their encounter with law enforcement.”). 
 81 Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997) (requiring reasonable suspicion for a strip search 
and visual body-cavity search of a misdemeanor arrestee); N.G. v. Connecticut, 382 F.3d 225, 232 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (same); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir. 1981) (same); Kelly v. Foti, 77 F.3d 
819, 821 (5th Cir. 1996) (same); Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1255 (6th Cir. 1989) (same); Mary 
Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1273 (same); Goff v. Nix, 803 F.2d 358, 370 (8th Cir. 1986) (same); Hill, 735 F.2d 
at 394–95 (same). 
 82 Bame v. Dillard, 637 F.3d 380, 386 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding strip searches conducted in the 
absence of individualized, reasonable suspicion constitutional); Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 
621 F.3d 296, 310 (3d Cir. 2010) (same); Bull v. City of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 975, 982 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en banc) (same); Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1307, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (same). 
 83 Helmer, supra note 8, at 242. 
 84 621 F.3d at 310. 
 85 621 F.3d 296, cert. granted, 563 U.S. 917 (2011). 
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prisoners’ bodily privacy.86 Following his arrest for an outstanding warrant 
for a minor traffic offense, the petitioner, Albert Florence, was strip-searched 
at two separate jail facilities under a blanket policy affecting all incoming 
detainees. 87  Both searches required Florence to lift his genitals, and the 
second search also required Florence to cough while squatting naked before 
officers.88 He later brought suit against the jails and other defendants for 
strip-searching him after an arrest for a minor offense in the absence of 
reasonable suspicion.89 
The Court upheld the blanket strip-search policy, reading Bell to 
authorize exactly such a search.90 In doing so, the Court rejected the felony-
versus-misdemeanor distinction adopted by some lower courts, citing 
evidence in the record showing that even minor offenders can be dangerous 
and can easily smuggle in contraband.91  The Court held the invasion of 
detainees’ privacy permissible because it was “reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests” in maintaining security. 92  Because 
detention officials are in the best position to determine and respond to 
security threats, the Court decided it best to trust their judgment “in the 
absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials 
have exaggerated their response to” any threat.93 
Despite the Court’s claim that the search in Bell was similar enough to 
the one in Florence for the former to control, scholars have noted significant 
differences between the cases.94 Most strikingly, Bell concerned searching 
 
 86 566 U.S. 318 (2012). 
 87 Id. at 323–24. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 324. 
 90 Id. at 334–38. 
 91 Id. at 334–37. 
 92 Id. at 326 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). 
 93 Id. at 328 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584 (1984)). 
 94 See generally Teresa A. Miller, Bright Lines, Black Bodies: The Florence Strip Search Case and 
Its Dire Repercussions, 46 AKRON L. REV. 433, 453 (2013) (observing that Bell concerned the strip-
searching of federal detainees after a contact visit in accordance with a policy approved by the Bureau of 
Prisons, in contrast with Florence, where an arrestee who had not undergone any contact with the outside 
world postarrest was strip-searched in a manner inconsistent with New Jersey state law and the procedural 
rules of both facilities in which he was searched); Nina Gleiberman, Florence v. Board of Chosen 
Freeholders: Maintaining Jail Security While Stripping Detainees of Their Constitutional Rights, 72 MD. 
L. REV. ENDNOTES 81, 98–100 (2013) (arguing that the Florence Court’s reliance on Bell was inapposite 
because, unlike the felony detainees in Bell, Florence was arrested for a minor offense and had not had 
his detainment reviewed by a magistrate judge prior to being strip-searched); Amanda Laufer, Comment, 
The Pendulum Continues to Swing in the Wrong Direction and the Fourth Amendment Moves Closer to 
the Edge of the Pit: The Ramifications of Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 42 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 383, 413–14 (2012) (arguing that Florence is distinguishable from Bell because the justifications 
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prisoners after a contact visit during which they could have received and 
concealed contraband, whereas Florence concerned a general arrestee 
entering the prison population from the outside world.95 In Bell, prisoners 
could simply choose not to go to visits or have contact during them to avoid 
undergoing a search upon their return, but in Florence, an arrestee could not 
avoid such a search.96  The Court overlooked this and other distinctions, 
instead deferring to the security interest of the jails.97 
The Court refused to go so far as to say that the Fourth Amendment 
offers pretrial detainees (and prisoners) no protection from strip searches.98 
Rather, the majority opinion, along with Chief Justice John Roberts’s and 
Justice Samuel Alito’s concurrences, merely stated that searches in 
circumstances like those presented (i.e., in detention facilities, applied only 
to detainees when they are admitted into the general population) are 
constitutional.99 Once again, the Court produced a narrow holding, upholding 
a particular strip search. The Bell Court, understandably, resisted any attempt 
to mechanically define what is “reasonable[]” under the Fourth 
Amendment100 but, in turn, provided little guidance for lower courts. The 
Florence Court, as noted in Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence, followed 
this trend to carefully limit its holding and not speak on different factual 
circumstances than those present “to ensure that we ‘not embarrass the 
future.’”101 This restraint, however, reproduced the inconsistent outcomes in 
lower courts that had occurred before Florence. 
D. The Current State of the Law: Renewed Uncertainty 
Florence’s narrow holding, like Bell’s, has only furthered confusion 
among the lower courts. Courts variously complain that  “[i]n the wake of 
Florence, it is unclear what standards apply under the Fourth . . . 
Amendment[] . . . to pretrial detainees who will not be placed in the general 
 
for strip searches during contact visits are distinguishable from those during arrests for minor offenses); 
Simcock, supra note 70, at 615–16 (arguing that the deterrence-based rationale that justified the blanket 
strip-search policy in Bell, where detainees could plan their contact visits around the illicit admission of 
contraband, was absent in Florence, where Albert Florence had no reason to suspect that he would be in 
custody and therefore no motivation to smuggle contraband into jail). 
 95 Miller, supra note 94, at 453–54. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Simcock, supra note 70, at 613. 
 98 Florence, 566 U.S. at 338–39. 
 99 Id. at 338, 340 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 341 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 100 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). 
 101 Florence, 566 U.S. at 340 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 
322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944)). 
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jail population,”102 that “Florence left many questions unanswered,”103 and 
that decisions are difficult to make because “the case law is inconsistent.”104 
Some courts have responded to this uncertainty by upholding strip 
searches in scenarios not explicitly contemplated by the Court. These courts 
have read Florence to authorize strip searches before and after a court 
hearing 105  or a rebooking, 106  even when detention officials present scant 
evidence that the detainee could have smuggled in contraband at any point.107 
Other courts have extended the holding of Florence to cover strip searches 
in nonintake contexts, like when prisoners are reentering their cells after 
being in the prison yard,108 law library,109 or dining hall,110 and upon returning 
from work.111 Finally, despite the fact that Florence concerned private strip 
searches, 112  courts have been similarly deferential when upholding 
nonprivate strip searches of multiple prisoners at a time.113 
 
 102 Phillips v. Sheridan Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., No. 12-CV-153-ABJ, 2015 WL 13689047, at *9 (D. 
Wyo. May 4, 2015). 
 103 Brownell v. Montoya, No. 11-0979 MV/GBW, 2013 WL 12334217, at *17 (D.N.M. Mar. 28, 
2013). 
 104 United States v. Perez, No. 17-10391-RGS, 2019 WL 181283, at *5 n.5 (D. Mass. Jan. 11, 2019). 
 105 See, e.g., Montgomery v. Hall, No. 11 Civ. 4645(PAC)(GWG), 2013 WL 1982920, at *3–4 
(S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 3816706 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 
2013) (upholding strip search before heading to court hearing); Myers v. City of New York, No. 11 Civ. 
8525(PAE), 2012 WL 3776707, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2012), appeal dismissed, No. 12-3824 (2d Cir. 
Nov. 8, 2012), and judgment aff’d, 529 F. App’x 105 (2d Cir. 2013) (same); Hanson v. Church, No. 11-
cv-534-SM, 2012 WL 4936491, at *3 (D.N.H. Sept. 4, 2012) (upholding visual cavity strip search before 
returning to detention after court hearing); Marzett v. Brown, No. 11-2264, 2012 WL 4482941, at *4 
(E.D. La. Sept. 28, 2012), appeal dismissed, No. 12-31113 (5th Cir. Mar. 6, 2013) (same). 
 106 See, e.g., Bayard v. Currier, No. 11-cv-598-SM, 2012 WL 4450836, at *10 (D.N.H. Aug. 8, 2012) 
(upholding strip search following rebooking before returning to detention). 
 107 Christopher Totten & Jamie Dapremont, Criminal Law Commentary: Post-Florence Interpretive 
Cases: An Analysis and Assessment, CRIM. L. BULL. ART, Summer 2014, at 7–8. 
 108 Barber v. Jones, No. 12-2578 (SRC), 2013 WL 211251, at *8 (D.N.J. Jan. 18, 2013). 
 109 Grant v. Wisener, No. 6:11cv372, 2013 WL 1196090, at *3–5 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2013). 
 110 Waddleton v. Jackson, No. C-10-267, 2012 WL 5289779, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2012), report 
and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 5289708 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2012), aff’d, No. 12-41256 (5th 
Cir. Dec. 12, 2013). 
 111 Tennell v. Rupert, No. 6:11cv448, 2012 WL 1899320, at *3 (E.D. Tex. May 24, 2012). 
 112 Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 296, 307 (3d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 566 U.S. 318 
(2012). 
 113  Sumpter v. Wayne County, 868 F.3d 473, 483 (6th Cir. 2017) (acknowledging especially 
intrusive nature of nonprivate strip search, but upholding because of Florence’s instruction to defer to 
prison officials’ expertise regarding the expediency of group searches); Lewis v. Sec’y of Pub. Safety & 
Corr., 870 F.3d 365, 367–69 (5th Cir. 2017) (upholding a strip search of up to ten prisoners at a time in 
part because of Florence’s directive to defer to the judgment of prison administrators); Small v. Wetzel, 
528 F. App’x 202, 206–07 (3d Cir. 2013) (relying on Florence to uphold cross-gender group searches in 
an open area following a prison lockdown). 
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A persistent minority of courts, however, have read Florence narrowly 
and refused to apply it except where the facts align completely. 114  For 
instance, in Fate v. Charles, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York refused to apply Florence where a search was 
discretionary (rather than blanket), a body-cavity search (rather than a mere 
visual inspection), and conducted at a police station (rather than a jail).115 
Each of these differences was major because Florence “cannot be read . . . 
to authorize suspicionless visual body cavity searches as a matter of law.”116 
Courts looking to distinguish Florence often reference Part IV of the 
majority opinion where the Court declined to comment on the applicability 
of its holding to circumstances where: “a detainee will be held without 
assignment to the general jail population and without substantial contact with 
other detainees”; “an arrestee[ʼs] . . . detention has not yet been reviewed by 
a magistrate or other judicial officer, and [the arrestee] can be held in 
available facilities removed from the general population”; “officers engag[e] 
in intentional humiliation and other abusive practices”; and “searches . . . 
involve the touching of detainees.”117 Accordingly, some courts challenge 
strip searches carried out before a judge has reviewed the validity of a 
misdemeanor detainee’s detention.118 Others refuse to apply Florence when 
the plaintiff was not entering the general population of a facility, as Albert 
Florence was, but rather was confined to a single-person cell and/or not 
interacting with other detainees, 119  or when the plaintiff underwent an 
especially intrusive search. 120  Moreover, courts have also found 
 
 114 See, e.g., Williams v. City of Cleveland, 771 F.3d 945, 951 (6th Cir. 2014) (reading Florence to 
only apply to the facts before it, leaving open constitutional analyses of other blanket strip-search policies 
for reasonableness). “Florence does not stand for the proposition that every search conducted pursuant to 
a jail’s uniformly applicable search policy is impregnable from attack on that basis alone.” Id. 
 115 24 F. Supp. 3d 337, 350–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 116 Id. at 350. 
 117 Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 338–39 (2012). 
 118 Haas v. Burlington County, 955 F. Supp. 2d 334, 338–39, 342–45 (D.N.J. 2013). 
 119 See, e.g., Hinkle v. Beckham Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 962 F.3d 1204, 1238 (10th Cir. 2020) 
(“Florence does not sanction such a policy—strip searching detainees not destined for the jail’s general 
population.”); Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir. 2016) (refusing to apply Florence to strip 
searching “inmates who have previously been thoroughly searched and held in a stripped-down isolation 
cell without human contact ever since”); Cantley v. W. Va. Reg’l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth., 771 F.3d 
201, 208 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Florence made clear that blanket strip searches prior to arraignment of arrestees 
not designated for assignment to the detention facility’s general population are constitutionally suspect 
in the absence of some particularized justification.”). 
 120 Brown v. Polk County, 965 F.3d 534, 539 (7th Cir. 2020) (requiring a showing of reasonable 
suspicion when an inmate was singled out for an invasive search because Florence only allowed a 
suspicionless search following a contact visit); Shorter v. Baca, 895 F.3d 1176, 1188 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(declining to extend Florence’s deference to jail officials for a strip search where officials “left 
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unreasonable searches that go beyond visual inspection, as in Florence, to 
forcibly seize items from an inmate’s body cavity.121 
After forty years of debate and much spilled ink, the law surrounding 
strip-searching prisoners still lacks cognizable doctrinal contours. No clear 
circuit split has emerged post-Florence, but the majority of lower courts has 
embraced expanding and extending the reach of the decision to essentially 
grant carte blanche to correctional facilities to search as they see fit.122 As 
such, the disparities between the circuits have only become starker since 
Florence, imperiling prisoners’ rights to bodily privacy. 
II. RATIONALES FOR AN INDIVIDUAL-SUSPICION STANDARD 
Numerous scholars have noted and criticized the Court’s failure to 
articulate a consistent standard for assessing the constitutionality of strip 
searches in prison.123 In response to this doctrinal ambiguity, scholars have 
proposed various solutions, the majority of which involve requiring 
individualized, reasonable suspicion before conducting a search. Though this 
Note ultimately advocates for the same standard, it interrogates the rationales 
scholars use to justify this standard and questions whether the Court would 
be persuaded by such rationales. This Part briefly reviews a selection of these 
justifications and explains why they may, at least by themselves, prove 
unpersuasive. It then addresses why the Court’s shift to a reasonable 
suspicion standard may be more persuasively justified by referencing 
international human-rights customs, previewing the ultimate solution that 
will be explored in the next Part. 
Scholars have asserted diverse rationales for why courts should adopt a 
reasonable suspicion standard. Nina Gleiberman has recommended that the 
 
noncompliant female inmates shackled to their cell doors for hours, virtually unclothed, and without 
access to meals, water, or a toilet”). 
 121 Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 231 (3d Cir. 2015); United States v. Fowlkes, 
804 F.3d 954, 966 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 122 Totten & Dapremont, supra note 107, at 8–9. 
 123 See, e.g., Diana R. Donahoe, Fourth Amendment “Cheeks” and Balances: The Supreme Court’s 
Inconsistent Conclusions and Deference to Law Enforcement Officials in Maryland v. King and Florence 
v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 549, 587 (2014) 
(critiquing “the Court’s inconsistent application of the Fourth Amendment” to strip-searching detainees 
and stating that it constitutes a judicial abdication of the responsibility to protect prisoners’ rights to bodily 
privacy); Gleiberman, supra note 94, at 103 (noting that the Court’s deferential decision-making “has 
been overly broad and poorly defined, causing confusion among lower courts”); Merrick D. Cosey, “Turn 
Around,” “Bend Over,” “Squat,” and “Cough”: The Supreme Court Strips the Fourth Amendment 
“Naked” in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 40 S.U. L. REV. 515, 516 (2013) (criticizing the 
Court’s unclear signaling to lower courts while “sen[ding] a very clear message to [strip-search 
victims:] . . . you have been stripped of your dignity”). 
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Court adopt American Bar Association (ABA) Standard 23-7.9,124 which 
requires a showing of individualized, reasonable suspicion before strip-
searching detainees arrested for minor, nonviolent, non-drug-related 
offenses in order to better protect detainees’ rights to bodily privacy. 125 
Daphne Ha has suggested courts require reasonable suspicion because 
social-science research has shown that strip searches traumatize prisoners.126 
Finally, Professor Diana R. Donahoe has pointed to the use of reasonable 
suspicion in numerous state laws127—as well as in federal law enforcement 
agencies such as the United States Marshals Service, the Immigration and 
Customs Service, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs—as evidence that the 
Supreme Court should adopt such a standard.128 
Despite their consensus on the appropriate standard, all three scholars’ 
rationales may face skepticism from judges. Gleiberman’s proposal asks the 
Court to follow the conclusions of an organization composed entirely of 
lawyers, which has produced standards which reflect only one viewpoint.129 
Her primary reason for advancing the proposal is its workability, as reflected 
in the fact that “[s]everal jurisdictions have implemented statutes that mimic 
the ABA strip search policy.”130 As she herself notes, however, the limited 
authorities that have adopted this standard still diverge from one 
anotherwith the Federal Bureau of Prisons and certain states adopting a 
reasonability standard for any minor offense versus other states requiring the 
same even for major crimes.131 The difference in such laws is far from minor. 
The patchwork nature of the ABA policy’s adoption underscores the need 
for reliance on a greater authority (namely, an international one) if a uniform 
standard is to be adopted domestically. 
Ha has argued that by going beyond a bare legal analysis, and 
incorporating social-science research into their opinions, judges can make a 
more appropriate assessment of the constitutionality of strip searches.132 Her 
social-science approach, however, may attract skepticism from those judges 
 
 124 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TREATMENT OF PRISONERS 223 (3d ed. 2011). 
 125 Gleiberman, supra note 94, at 104–05. 
 126 Ha, supra note 22, at 2739–43, 2758 (detailing studies conducted in Canada, Australia, and the 
United Kingdom surveying the psychological impact of strip searches on detainees). 
 127 Donahoe, supra note 123, at 583–84 n.233. 
 128 Id. at 584. 
 129  See About the ABA, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba/ 
[https://perma.cc/7Z52-7Z6H]. 
 130 Gleiberman, supra note 94, at 105. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Ha, supra note 22, at 2732. 
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who disfavor reliance on social-science research to make legal decisions,133 
or, conversely, from those who can cite to conflicting studies or a lack of 
conclusive evidence on the matter as a reason for striking down reasonable 
suspicion. 134  Ha acknowledges the reluctance a social-science-based 
rationale may face from judges135 but contends that social-science research 
will continue nonetheless.136 This response does not, however, explain why 
skeptical judges would nevertheless be persuaded by such rationales. Ha 
notes that the Court has at times cited social-science research in its 
opinions, 137  but, more often, various justices have reacted with strong 
skepticism to arguments premised on social science. 138  Indeed, as Ha 
mentions, Pennsylvania Prison Society filed an amicus brief in Florence at 
the circuit court level that cited to the body of research detailing the 
psychologically deleterious effects of strip searches on prisoners as a reason 
for the Court to limit such searches, but to no avail. 139  The Court was 
unpersuaded by this rationale and, as such, Ha’s argument that courts should 
favor reasonable suspicion is less strong. 
Professor Donahoe’s evidence of other authorities using reasonable 
suspicion is useful in showing that such a standard is feasible, but it may not 
wholly persuade the reader that such a standard is normatively desirable or 
the only constitutional option. That select authorities or certain states have 
adopted a standard does not necessarily comment on its applicability or 
desirability to be implemented nationwide. By contrast, the fact that an 
 
 133 Amy Rublin, The Role of Social Science in Judicial Decision Making: How Gay Rights Advocates 
Can Learn from Integration and Capital Punishment Case Law, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 179, 
211 (2011) (“Courts sometimes acknowledge the existence and potential significance of empirical 
outcomes but prefer to push interpretation upon legislatures on the basis that legislatures allegedly have 
superior tools for comprehending studies.”). 
 134 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 763, 766 
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (contending that social-science-based arguments “would leave our . . . 
jurisprudence at the mercy of elected government officials evaluating the evanescent views of a handful 
of social scientists”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 618 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Given the 
nuances of scientific methodology and conflicting views, courts—which can only consider the limited 
evidence on the record before them—are ill equipped to determine which view of science is the right 
one.”). 
 135 Ha, supra note 22, at 2732–33. 
 136 Id. at 2738. 
 137 Id. at 2736. 
 138 See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 780 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that following 
social-science research in cases of constitutional interpretation “would constitutionalize today’s faddish 
social theories”); see also supra note 134. 
 139 Ha, supra note 22, at 2753 (citing Brief on Behalf of Amicus Curiae Pennsylvania Prison Society 
in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee Albert W. Florence, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 
296 (3d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 09-3603, 09-3661)). 
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international consensus has coalesced around a particular standard alleviates 
concerns that one may be favoring a “provincial standard[] that can fluctuate 
according to local tastes and politics.”140 Unlike with merely state or federal 
law, an internationally approved standard adds objectivity.141 
The rationale this Note proposes—following international customary 
law in the form of the SMRs—takes into account the consensus of over 100 
nations, as well as social-science researchers, civil-society advocates, and 
correctional professionals, thus providing additional persuasive support for 
the reasonable suspicion standard. 142  International law does not rest on 
fluctuating social-science findings alone, like Ha’s solution, and, by 
representing international norms, is arguably more objective (in that it takes 
into account the input of global authorities) than Gleiberman’s and Professor 
Donahoe’s suggestions. 
Though certain domestic authorities advocate for the use of a 
reasonable suspicion standard in strip-searching prisoners,143 the debate is far 
from settled in the United States. By contrast, the international norm 
represents unified support of reasonable suspicion following robust debate 
among various international organizations, scholars, and governments. 144 
The argument for the adoption of reasonable suspicion grows stronger, 
therefore, when moving beyond “a more insular American outlook,” to the 
weight of international consensus. 145  When domestic jurisprudence has 
failed, courts are well-advised to move beyond the partial knowledge of local 
institutions and instead also rely upon the “accumulated wisdom of the world 
on rights and justice.”146 In particular, where a legal problem touches on 
“dignitarian issues and . . . tangled issues of culpability,” 147  such as the 
 
 140 Chung, supra note 42, at 2396. 
 141 Id. 
 142  See United Nations Prison-Related Standards and Norms, UN OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, 
http://www.unodc.org/newsletter/pt/perspectives/no02/page004a.html [https://perma.cc/6Z98-XLVW] 
(noting that over 100 countries have followed the SMRs); Aleksandra Gruevska Drakulevski, The Nelson 
Mandela Rules: The Revised United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners—
Short Review, 8 IUSTINIANUS PRIMUS L. REV. 1, 2, 6 (2017); Jennifer Peirce, Making the Mandela Rules: 
Evidence, Expertise, and Politics in the Development of Soft Law International Prison Standards, 
43 QUEEN’S L.J. 263, 291–93 (2018). 
 143 See infra notes 243–248 and accompanying text. 
 144 Glensy, supra note 39, at 254. 
 145 Id. at 237; see also Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 129, 138 (2005) (arguing that “judges sound more substantial when they talk about ‘the 
overwhelming weight of international opinion’” in their opinions (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 578 (2005))). 
 146 Waldron, supra note 145, at 138. 
 147 Id. at 143–44. 
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debate on capital punishment or prisoners’ bodily privacy, courts can find 
useful ideas in norms with more widespread backing than merely those from 
domestic authorities. 
An additional reason why looking to the international norm may prove 
more persuasive is because the nature of the problem—the vagaries of the 
Fourth Amendment—itself beckons such a solution. Many areas of 
American law, for varying reasons, suffer from doctrinal uncertainty, but the 
Fourth Amendment is unique because the right to bodily privacy is globally 
recognized. The fundamental right of bodily privacy is therefore best 
understood within a global context. In this manner, the Fourth Amendment 
is like the Eighth Amendment, which the Supreme Court has noted also 
concerns “certain fundamental rights” whose understanding “by other 
nations and peoples . . . underscores the centrality of those same rights within 
our own heritage of freedom.”148 Scholars have argued that as an amendment 
concerning fundamental rights, standards under the Eighth Amendment 
“should not merely mirror the subjective views of judges, but should be 
based on objective factors as developed by human rights theorists and 
organizations.” 149  Other scholars have utilized international norms when 
interpreting amendments related to other fundamental rights, such as equal 
protection and substantive due process, 150  as well as other constitutional 
features, including takings, eminent domain, just compensation, involuntary 
servitude, and procedural due process.151 
Moreover, like the Fourth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment has 
suffered from inconsistent application, which has led multiple scholars to 
suggest that international norms may introduce uniformity into the 
analysis.152 Such an international outlook is appropriate because, in the words 
of former Chief Justice Earl Warren writing for a plurality of the Court, 
 
 148 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
 149 Chung, supra note 42, at 2395; see also Miller, supra note 42, at 171 (“Because the Eighth 
Amendment was meant to be dynamic[,] . . . the courts . . . should extend the prohibition against ‘cruel 
and unusual punishments’ to include any and all definitions provided by the international community.”); 
Dick, supra note 42, at 317 (according to the Court, “the Eighth Amendment must draw its meaning from 
the evolving standards of decency in maturing societies[,] . . . . [so] the deprivation of prison programs 
arguably violates the Eighth Amendment”). 
 150 See Glensy, supra note 39, at 241–43; Gordon A. Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to 
Inform Due Process and Equal Protection Analyses, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 3, 20 (1983). 
 151 See Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 63–87 (2006). 
 152 See, e.g., Dick, supra note 42, at 317 (arguing “[t]he inconsistent application of the Eighth 
Amendment is in itself evidence that a reevaluation of the current standards is necessary” and urging 
courts to “develop a standard more consistent with today’s international norms on penal justice”); 
Coppola, supra note 47, at 224 (noting an absence of domestic “jurisprudence on duration limits for 
solitary confinement”). 
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“[t]he [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”153 In 
determining these standards, “‘the climate of international opinion 
concerning the acceptability of a particular punishment’ is an additional 
consideration which is ‘not irrelevant’” to the Court’s inquiry.154 The Court 
has therefore “recognized the relevance of the views of the international 
community in determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.”155 
The Fourth Amendment fits into the above pattern in that its 
interpretation is served by using international norms. First, like the Eighth 
Amendment, the Fourth Amendment concerns a fundamental right with 
historical roots—bodily privacy, 156  which, like the bar against cruel and 
unsual punishment, similarly concerns “nothing less than the dignity of 
man.”157 Where this dignity is concerned, the Justices have supported looking 
toward international sources because “there’s . . . some underlying common 
shared idea . . . [and] unified concept of what human dignity means.”158 With 
regard to concepts like cruel and unusual punishment and bodily privacy, 
“[t]he United States has never been a hermetically sealed legal system” 
because such concepts “have long carried global meaning.”159 The Fourth 
Amendment’s text does not simply limit its understanding to domestic law.160 
As such, it is better understood by looking at domestic sources (as other 
 
 153 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 154 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 
n.10 (1977)). 
 155 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 n.31 (1988); see also Chung, supra note 42, at 2353 
(“International norms can assist the courts in gaining a more comprehensive understanding of the 
contemporary standard of decency, an essential element in assessing Eighth Amendment claims.”). In 
Thompson, the Court held “that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of a person 
who was” fewer than sixteen years old at the time of the crime. 487 U.S. at 838. 
 156 See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985) (noting that the Fourth Amendment’s main 
purpose is to “protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State” (quoting 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966))); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) 
(finding that evidence obtained by pumping a suspect’s stomach was inadmissible under the Fourteenth 
Amendment because it violated notions of human dignity among “English-speaking peoples” (quoting 
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 41617 (1945))). 
 157 Trop, 356 U.S. at 100 (using international materials to determine the contours of the Eighth 
Amendment). 
 158  Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift, NEW YORKER (Sept. 12, 2005), https://www. 
newyorker.com/magazine/2005/09/12/swing-shift [https://perma.cc/UWH2-BF9V] (quoting Justice 
Anthony Kennedy). 
 159 See Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L. L. 43, 47 (2004). 
 160 See James I. Pearce, International Materials and the Eighth Amendment: Some Thoughts on 
Method After Graham v. Florida, 21 DUKE J. COMPAR. & INT’L L. 235, 240 (2010) (noting the same for 
the Eighth Amendment). 
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scholars have proposed) as well as international norms.161 Second, the Fourth 
Amendment too suffers from inconsistent application, as detailed in Part I. 
Accordingly, this Note proposes using the Supreme Court’s tried and 
tested methodology of referencing international norms in interpreting the 
Eighth Amendment to guide the application of the Fourth Amendment in 
prisons. The lifting of a tool of constitutional interpretation from one 
jurisprudential sphere to another to help clarify doctrinal ambiguities is not 
unprecedented. Aptly termed “constitutional borrowing” by Professors 
Nelson Tebbe and Robert L. Tsai, such a practice is both legitimate and 
common, used by judges to “import[] doctrines, rationales, tropes, or other 
legal elements from one area of constitutional law into another for persuasive 
ends”162 and “to take advantage of accumulated wisdom.”163 In particular, 
where the attitude of various authorities has coalesced around a particular 
standard, the Court has used constitutional borrowing to interpret a 
constitutional provision in line with such a standard.164 An example of this 
occurred in the 1980s, when then-Attorney General William French Smith’s 
Task Force on Violent Crime advocated for the inclusion of a “good faith” 
exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and Congress even 
debated changing the rule through legislative means.165 The Court adopted 
this view a few years later in United States v. Leon,166 in which it borrowed 
the idea of a “good faith” defense in the form of qualified immunity from 
constitutional tort law and imported it into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
to create the exception.167 Similarly, here, as noted by Professor Donahoe,168 
domestic authorities have coalesced around the reasonable suspicion 
standard.169 The Court would thus be well-advised to use the international-
norm-focused methodology it has employed for decades in Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence170 to reach a similar result in the arena of Fourth 
Amendment debate. 
 
 161 Id. (arguing that the Eighth Amendment’s “deep historical resonance[] arguably envisions a more 
expansive construction” for it). 
 162 Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 461 (2010). 
 163 Id. at 467. 
 164 See Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 
111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 694–95 (2011). 
 165 Id. 
 166 468 U.S. 897, 919–25 (1984). 
 167 Laurin, supra note 164, at 672. 
 168 Donahoe, supra note 123, at 583–84. 
 169 See id. 
 170 See infra notes 186–196 and accompanying text (listing where the Court has done so in Eighth 
Amendment cases). 
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This Part has shown that previously proposed solutions favoring the 
adoption of a reasonable suspicion standard may not ultimately persuade the 
Court through rationales grounded in domestic law. By contrast, looking to 
international consensus bolsters arguments in favor of a reasonable suspicion 
standard because it reflects the agreement of nations and experts. In tandem 
with other scholars’ rationales, it makes a stronger case for requiring 
individualized, reasonable suspicion before conducting a strip search. This 
Part has additionally established that the Fourth Amendment’s inexorable 
connection to a fundamental right (here, bodily privacy) and inconsistent 
application make it akin to the Eighth Amendment, which both the Court and 
scholars have understood with reference to international norms. The Court 
should thus import its international-norm-focused interpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment to the Fourth Amendment to similarly determine its 
contours. The next Part explores this novel international-norm-focused 
solution for the Fourth Amendment. 
III. AN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN-RIGHTS SOLUTION 
This Part begins by identifying why courts should look to international 
law—specifically international customary law—to resolve the current 
domestic legal uncertainty surrounding prisoners’ rights to bodily privacy. It 
then briefly recounts the history of U.S. courts, including the Supreme Court, 
referencing and relying on international customary law in cases concerning 
human rights. In particular, this Part focuses on the Court’s use of 
international customary law to interpret the Eighth Amendment and proposes 
using the same approach for the Fourth Amendment. This Part then addresses 
common counterarguments against the use of international customary law in 
domestic jurisprudence, including concerns that it will lead to an imposition 
of foreign values, curtail rights guaranteed by the Constitution, and weaken 
the legitimacy of the judiciary’s decision-making. Finally, this Part describes 
the proposal to use the SMRs to guide the Court’s interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment as applied to prisoners’ rights to bodily privacy and explores 
how this proposal would work in practice. 
A. Using International Customary Law as a Tool of  
U.S. Constitutional Interpretation 
To resolve the uncertainty surrounding the extent to which the Fourth 
Amendment protects prisoners’ bodily privacy, this Note proposes looking 
to standards of international law. International law consists of both treaties 
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and customary law.171 The former, when unratified, are unenforceable in the 
United States. 172  International customary law, however, can be applied 
without ratification because it represents the settled consensus among 
nations. 173  The norms do not, by themselves, create their own judicially 
enforceable private rights,174 but they are persuasive authority for federal 
courts. Resolutions relating to human rights adopted by international 
organizations, such as the United Nations, are an example of international 
customary law.175 
Courts have had difficulty ruling consistently on the constitutionality of 
prisoner strip searches because the Fourth Amendment right to bodily 
privacy is not clearly defined. The narrow holdings of Bell and Florence 
have left lower courts without direction, producing a maze of case law with 
inconsistent holdings,176 and previously proposed solutions relying only on 
domestic sources may not carry enough weight. 177  Representing the 
consensus of nations, however, an international resolution responds to a 
“constitutional cacophony”178 with a unified response. Such a response is the 
informed conclusion of knowledgeable bodies well versed in cross-cultural 
perspectives and therefore “preferable to the ad hoc articulation of values by 
 
 171 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
(1987) (explaining the implications of international law in the United States). 
 172 Martin A. Geer, Human Rights and Wrongs in Our Own Backyard: Incorporating International 
Human Rights Protections Under Domestic Civil Rights Law—A Case Study of Women in United States 
Prisons, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 71, 110 (2000). Additionally, the United States has ratified only a few 
international human-rights treaties, and the few it has ratified require little by way of obligations. Richard 
B. Lillich, The United States Constitution and International Human Rights Law, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 
53, 62 (1990). Even when ratified, human-rights treaties are rarely found to be enforceable without 
enabling legislation from Congress and thus most human-rights treaties have no place in court. Id. 
 173 Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1557 
(1984) (arguing that international customary law, unlike treaties, is self-executing into domestic 
jurisprudence); see also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) (“When the United States 
declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations.”). 
 174 See Princz v. Fed. Republic of Ger., 26 F.3d 1166, 1174–75 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“While it is 
true that ‘international law is part of our law,’ it is also our law that a federal court is not competent to 
hear a claim arising under international law absent a statute granting such jurisdiction.” (quoting The 
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900))). 
 175 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 103 n.2. 
 176  See Robin Lee Fenton, The Constitutionality of Policies Requiring Strip Searches of All 
Misdemeanants and Minor Traffic Offenders, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 175, 176, 178 (1985) (noting that the 
Bell balancing test has led to doctrinal uncertainty and produced inconsistent holdings); Helmer, supra 
note 8, at 258 (“This ad hoc approach [of balancing] provides little guidance.”); see also supra Sections 
I.B, II.A. 
 177 See supra Part II. 
 178 See generally Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth 
Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1337 (2012) (analyzing circuit splits in Fourth Amendment law). 
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an individual judge,” particularly when it comes to an issue as important as 
bodily privacy.179 Where domestic jurisprudence has failed to resolve the 
debate, international law “expands the horizon and the interpretive field of 
vision” to “enrich[] the options available.” 180  As persuasive authority 
representing the law of nations, an international resolution prevents judges 
from ruling in a vacuum and instead compels them to compare their decisions 
with those of an international body, such as the United Nations.181 Thus, it is 
advisable for courts to use and apply international norms to resolve domestic 
disputes.182 
There is a centuries-old precedent of referencing international 
customary law in domestic disputes. The Court’s decisions from the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries consistently acknowledge and refer 
to international customary law.183 At the turn of the twentieth century, the 
Court articulated the principle that international customary law is “part of 
our law.” 184  Since then, the modern Court has repeatedly referenced 
international customary law in its opinions.185 An example of this approach 
 
 179 Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, International Human Rights Law in United States Courts: A 
Comparative Perspective, 14 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 88 (1992). 
 180 AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 197 (2006). 
 181 Glensy, supra note 39, at 22324. 
 182 See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 145, at 13132, 146 (arguing that, because international norms 
represent the settled consensus of nations on a matter, U.S. courts should draw upon them to resolve close 
questions on matters of penal law). 
 183 See, e.g., The Commercen, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 382, 387–88 (1816); Brown v. United States, 
12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128 (1814); id. at 139, 145, 147 (Story, J., dissenting); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 
(3 Dall.) 199, 224, 229 (opinion of Chase, J.); id. at 269 (opinion of Iredell, J.); id. at 281 (opinion of 
Wilson, J.). 
 184 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). In this case, the Court held that it was unlawful 
under the law of nations for American squadrons to seize fishing vessels as prizes of war. Id. at 714. 
Though this rule was not contained in any treaty or statute, it was reflective of the international consensus 
and therefore courts were to take notice of the rule in the United States. Id. This case was not, however, 
the first mention of such international consensus as persuasive legal authority. Over one hundred years 
prior, Chief Justice John Jay argued that “the United States had, by taking a place among the nations of 
the earth, become amenable to the laws of nations.” Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 
(1793); see also The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) (referencing the persuasive weight of 
the “law of nations”). But see Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights: 
Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 69, 7172 (2004) (arguing the Court’s “scattered” 
appeals over time to international law have little precedential value); Roger P. Alford, Misusing 
International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 63 (2004) (arguing that 
international law “is not our protean law” and that “[t]he status of international law remains 
subconstitutional”). 
 185 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576–77 (2003) (noting that Texas’s ban on sodomy 
clashes with the laws of most Western nations and the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, 
and that “[t]he right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of human 
freedom in many other countries”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1764 
is Trop v. Dulles, where the Court found loss of nationality for military 
desertion to be a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.186 The Court was persuaded that the Eighth Amendment forbids 
such a punishment because international consensus holds that loss of 
nationality is an unacceptable consequence for the commission of a crime.187 
The Court noted that the Eighth Amendment aims to protect human dignity, 
an amorphous concept incapable of precise definition.188 Because it is so 
broad-reaching, “[t]he Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” 189 
International custom can thus help to define the Amendment’s parameters. 
Since Trop, the Court has continuously looked to the law of nations to 
further rule in the Eighth Amendment context.190 The Court has referenced 
international law when outlawing the death penalty for juvenile defendants191 
and in part relied on the fact that sentencing intellectually disabled criminals 
to death is “overwhelmingly disapproved” of by “the world community”192 
to rule likewise in the domestic context.193 Chief Justice William Rehnquist 
and Justice Antonin Scalia voiced consistent opposition to reliance on 
international norms, usually in dissent, 194  but occasionally as part of a 
 
concurring) (referencing the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women); 
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 302 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (relying on “[c]ontemporary 
human rights documents” such as United Nations-initiated Conventions on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination and on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women to help 
create legal standards for racial equality). 
 186 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1957) (plurality opinion). 
 187 Id. at 102. 
 188 Id. at 100. 
 189 Id. at 101. 
 190 See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (holding that the death penalty was 
not an appropriate punishment for raping an adult woman and noting that a minority of major world 
nations still allow the death penalty for rape); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796–97 n.22 (1982) 
(observing that the Commonwealth countries and continental Europe had outlawed the death penalty for 
felony murder before holding likewise in the domestic context). 
 191 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 n.31 (1988) (plurality opinion) (noting “the relevance 
of the views of the international community in determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual”). 
 192 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (holding that sentencing intellectually disabled 
criminals to death violates the Eighth Amendment). 
 193 Id. at 321. 
 194 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“More fundamentally, 
however, the basic premise of the Court’s argument—that American law should conform to the laws of 
the rest of the world—ought to be rejected out of hand.”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 324–25 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting) (“I fail to see, however, how the views of other countries regarding the punishment of their 
citizens provide any support for the Court’s ultimate determination.”). For further discussion of 
counterarguments to using international law, see infra Section III.B. 
115:1737 (2021) The Fourth Amendment Stripped Bare 
1765 
plurality. 195  By the early 2000s, however, any opposition was firmly 
relegated to the background,196 and the use of international law even moved 
beyond the Eighth Amendment to include Fourteenth Amendment cases.197 
The constitutional provisions the Court has used to interpret 
international customary law share one quality: they concern ideas of liberty 
and fundamental justice “that transcend[] borders” and are therefore 
amenable to interpretation in light of international norms.198 As established 
in Part II, the Fourth Amendment shares these qualitieslike the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, it aims to protect human dignity and is far-reaching 
in its protections.199  The precise extent of these protections, however, is 
debatable. Thus, where the contours of Fourth Amendment rights have 
proven uncertain as applied to prisoners, the “customs and usages of civilized 
nations”200 can offer some guidance. 
B. Counterarguments to the Use of International Customary Law in 
Domestic Jurisprudence 
This Section addresses and refutes counterarguments to applying 
international norms in domestic constitutional disputes. First, some scholars 
and jurists fear that being guided by international custom will lead to an 
imposition of foreign values in the domestic context.201 This fear, however, 
 
 195 E.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (finding that, 
in interpreting the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, “it is American conceptions of decency that are 
dispositive”). In other words, what matters is what Americans think is “cruel and unusual punishment,” 
not what the consensus of nations has determined. 
 196 Roper, 543 U.S. at 575–76, 578 (relying on human-rights treaties, such as the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as the numerical minority of countries in the world who 
still execute juvenile offenders, as nonbinding but “instructive” authority to conclude that the death 
penalty for juveniles ran afoul of the Eighth Amendment). Justice Scalia once again protested this in 
dissent. Id. at 622–628 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 197 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573, 576–77 (2003) (noting Texas’s ban on sodomy clashes 
with that of most Western nations and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights before striking 
down the ban under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Justice Scalia, in dissent, 
responded that “[c]onstitutional entitlements do not spring into existence . . . because foreign nations 
decriminalize conduct.” Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 198  Rex D. Glensy, Which Countries Count?: Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign 
Persuasive Authority, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 357, 382 (2005). 
 199 See cases cited supra notes 156 (regarding the Fourth Amendment), 190 (regarding the Eighth 
Amendment). 
 200 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
 201 See Alford, supra note 184, at 58 (quoting Harold Hongju Koh, Paying “Decent Respect” to 
World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1085, 1129 (2002)) (arguing that such a 
practice can allow the “‘global opinions of humankind’ . . . to thwart the domestic opinions of 
Americans”); Carlos F. Rosenkrantz, Against Borrowings and Other Nonauthoritative Uses of Foreign 
Law, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 269, 293–94 (2003) (contending that the use of international law to help 
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is inapposite because this Note does not argue (or even contemplate as 
feasible) that U.S. courts should listen to foreign guidance where such 
guidance clashes with settled domestic jurisprudence. 202  Similarly, in 
response to the concern that the use of international law may lead U.S. courts 
to eliminate certain rights under domestic law or limit the freedom of 
American citizens, 203  this Note emphasizes that such an outcome is not 
possible under the U.S. Constitution, which “prevents the Court from taking 
away rights simply because other countries do not afford their citizens the 
same rights.”204 
International law does not preside over or replace domestic law, but 
rather serves as a means of confirmation for domestic opinions concerning 
human rights. This more limited use of international customary law is 
favored by the Court, which has found that “the opinion of the world 
community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and 
significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”205 This Note does not 
agree with the view that international customary law is binding upon all 
nations or adds to some sort of federal common law.206 International norms 
are not a source of rights in themselves, but rather tools of interpretation for 
domestic constitutional provisions. 207  International materials serve to 
 
interpret the Constitution subverts the authority of the unique American constitutional culture, as 
fashioned by domestic debate); see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
use of international law in domestic jurisprudence renders “essentially irrelevant” American opinions 
regarding the law). 
 202 See Glensy, supra note 39, at 254 (discussing when international law is persuasive). An example 
of this principle is found in Section III.C.1, where this Note interprets the SMRs’ guidance that strip 
searches should be conducted only where “absolutely necessary” as pointing to reasonable suspicion, not 
probable cause, even if that is closer to “absolutely necessary,” because Bell already settled that probable 
cause is not required to perform a strip search. 
 203 See Alford, supra note 184, at 69 (noting that adopting other countries’ less generous human-
rights standards may lead to a curtailment of domestic liberties, “a prospect [that] should give one pause 
before embarking on the project of using international sources to interpret the Constitution”); Ramsey, 
supra note 184, at 81 (contending that the use of international customary law “requires that U.S. rights 
be cut back in areas where the United States is an outlier, and these instances probably far outnumber 
cases where international materials favor expanding rights”). 
 204  Jessica Mishali, Roper v. SimmonsSupreme Court’s Reliance on International Law in 
Constitutional Decision-Making, 21 TOURO L. REV. 1299, 1313 (2006). 
 205 Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. The Court added that “[i]t does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution 
or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by 
other nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage 
of freedom.” Id. 
 206  See Christenson, supra note 150, at 20 (finding theories regarding the “incorporation” of 
international law into domestic law weaker than other arguments and vulnerable to easy rejection by 
courts). 
 207 Id. 
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confirm the Court’s conclusions and offer a comparative tool by which to 
illuminate their decisions on matters of fundamental importance, such as 
basic human rights.208 Looking to international custom contextualizes the 
Court’s decisions regarding constitutional rights and helps to add weight to 
its conclusions where there may be uncertainty.209 Used in tandem with other 
forms of persuasive authority, such as the practices of federal and state 
authorities, historical practices, and social-science research, international 
custom can tip the balance in favor of one particular view and afford it 
greater weight. This Note argues for precisely such a limited use of 
international law in the domestic sphere, only applying it where it is directly 
applicable with “due regard for . . . purpose and function in the constitutional 
design.”210 Specifically, this Note only uses international law where there is 
uncertainty regarding a matter of fundamental human right coupled with a 
strong and definitive international consensus on the protection of that right 
in prisons. 
Second, there is a concern that allowing international norms to guide 
domestic interpretation will lessen the legitimacy of the domestic courts by 
sullying their decision-making with foreign sources. 211  Such a view, 
however, ignores the fact that aligning with the international consensus 
promotes legitimacy, rather than undermining it.212 The normative value of 
having the United States take into account the consensus of the majority of 
nations cannot be understated. Currently, the United States’ promotion of 
human rights abroad but failure to adopt widely accepted human-rights 
standards at home is an act of hypocrisy that reduces its credibility.213 To 
ignore international law risks making the United States a legal outlier in the 
 
 208 Id. at 5. 
 209 Id. at 17 (“[International] norms supply a context, guide interpretation and fill gaps in the positive 
law.”). 
 210 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 560. 
 211 See Rosenkrantz, supra note 201, at 294 (arguing that the use of “foreign law deprives the courts 
that refer to it of the . . . finality that their rulings must provoke in order to be seen as the last word in our 
social confrontations”); LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 29–30 
(1968). 
 212 Ganesh Sitaraman, The Use and Abuse of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 32 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 653, 661 (2009) (arguing that the United States, like every other nation, “needs to be 
accepted as legitimate within the international system, and that too might require a broader role for foreign 
law in constitutional interpretation”). 
 213 Dick, supra note 42, at 321 (arguing that the United States talks “out of both sides of its mouth” 
about human rights (quoting Emily A. Whitney, Correctional Rehabilitation Programs and the Adoption 
of International Standards: How the United States Can Reduce Recidivism and Promote the National 
Interest, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 777, 782 (2009))). 
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world, and not in a positive sense.214 The United States should “not turn 
completely inward in judicial attitude in ways that deny the rich traditions of 
the rule of law beyond our borders.”215 Rather, domestic courts should resist 
irrational fears about takeover from foreign law and use international custom 
as a tool to strengthen their holdings. 
C. Using the SMRs to Guide the Application of the 
Fourth Amendment in Prisons 
Building from the robust tradition of analyzing the Constitution in light 
of the law of nations, this Note proposes that courts should look to 
international customary law to help interpret the Fourth Amendment and 
clarify its vagaries. The SMRs 216 —a key document of international 
customary law217—can help define the right to bodily privacy as applied to 
prisoners under the Fourth Amendment. The SMRs were adopted by the First 
UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 
1955218 and have been enormously influential, aiding in the creation of model 
penal codes and criminal-justice standards in over 100 countries. 219  The 
United States incorporated the SMRs’ guidance into the 1962 Model Penal 
Code. States including Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Ohio, Minnesota, 
Connecticut, and Illinois then used the SMRs as a guide when passing a “Bill 
of Rights” for prisoners.220 Decades later, the UN revised the rules to bring 
them into accordance with changing human-rights standards and social-
science research on prison conditions.221 The updated rules passed following 
the consensus of the UN member states, including the United States. 222 
 
 214 Chung, supra note 42, at 2399 (suggesting that the United States should take a more active role 
on the world stage by implementing international human-rights standards within its own justice system). 
 215 Christenson, supra note 150, at 35. 
 216 G.A. Res. 70/175, supra note 38. 
 217 See HUMAN RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 39, at 115; see also The Standard Minimum Rules 
for the Treatment of Prisoners in the Light of Recent Developments in the Correctional Field, ¶ 50, 
Working Paper by the Secretariat, 4 U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders, 1, 13–18, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 43/3 (1970), reprinted in RICHARD B. LILLICH & HURST 
HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 296–300 (3d 
ed. 1995) (contending that the SMRs have “effective local judicial recognition” around the world because 
of their status as the recognized international standards). 
 218 G.A. Res. 70/175, supra note 38, at 1. 
 219  United Nations Prison-Related Standards and Norms, U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, 
http://www.unodc.org/newsletter/pt/perspectives/no02/page004a.html [https://perma.cc/7YBZ-2SWR]. 
 220 Daniel L. Skoler, World Implementation of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for 
Treatment of Prisoners, 10 J. INT’L L. & ECON. 453, 462 (1975). 
 221 Drakulevski, supra note 142, at 2. 
 222 Philipp Meissner, Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission Hearing: Advancing Human Rights 
Through International Prison Reform, U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME (Jan. 18, 2018), 
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Rewritten in consultation with civil-society advocates and correctional 
professionals,223 the rules have already been used by countries to revise their 
laws regarding prison conditions. 224  Legal advocates in Canada, 225 
Argentina,226 and Thailand227 have already employed the rules in court cases 
concerning prison conditions. 
The SMRs have also been enthusiastically applied in the domestic 
context, most consistently regarding the constitutional treatment of prisoners 
under the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court has called the SMRs an 
exemplar of the “contemporary standards of decency” regarding the medical 
treatment of prisoners.228 The Sixth Circuit has relied on them to find that 
shackling pregnant detainees while in labor “offends contemporary 
standards of human decency such that the practice violates the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain.’”229 The Second Circuit has likewise found that the SMRs are “one of 




 223 Peirce, supra note 142, at 291. 
 224 Id. at 265 (citing examples of Argentina and Thailand). 
 225 See Corp. of the Canadian Civ. Liberties Ass’n v. Her Majesty the Queen, 2017 ONSC 7491, 
para. 53 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); B.C. Civ. Liberties Ass’n v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), 2018 BCSC 62, para. 
57 (Can. B.C.). Both cases found that the revised SMRs are relevant to understanding domestic Canadian 
law on prisoners’ rights. Peirce, supra note 142, at 265 n.10. 
 226  See Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 
3/5/2005, “Verbitsky, Horacio / habeas corpus,” Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación 
[Fallos] (2005-328-1146). Argentina has long used the SMRs as a model for their prison-condition 
legislation, with the Argentinian Supreme Court holding in 2005 that the SMRs define the standard of 
dignified treatment for prisoners under Article 18 of the Constitution. Ministerio Público Fiscal, “Reglas 
Mandela”: Reglas Mínimas de Naciones Unidas para el Tratamiento de los Reclusos, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.15/L.6/Rev.1 (2015). 
 227 Thailand is using the revised SMRs fully in one prison, Thonburi Remand Prison, and will use it 
to define the new standards in new laws passed about prisoners. Thongchai, Implementation of the Nelson 
Mandela Rules in Thailand, THAI. CRIMINOLOGY & CORR. (July 18, 2016), 
http://thaicriminology.com/implementation-of-the-nelson-mandela-rules-in-thailand.html [https://perma. 
cc/S9RW-MPSQ]. 
 228 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (citing the SMRs). In this case, the Court held that 
“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners . . . [is] proscribed by the Eighth 
Amendment.” Id. at 104. The Court found such indifference to contradict agreed-upon standards of 
decency like those found in the SMRs. Id. at 103 n.8. 
 229  Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 574 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Estelle, 
429 U.S. at 104). “In its Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, the United Nations 
stated that restraints including handcuffs and leg irons should only be used ‘[a]s a precaution against 
escape,’ ‘[o]n medical grounds by direction of the medical officer,’ or ‘if other methods of control fail, 
in order to prevent a prisoner from injuring himself or others or from damaging property.’” Id. at 572–73 
(quoting E.S.C. Res. 663 C (XXIV) (July 31, 1957), 2076 (LXII) (May 13, 1977), at Rule 33). 
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the SMRs to affirm a lower court holding that placing inmates in 
overcrowded prison conditions violates the Eighth Amendment.230 Beyond 
the Eighth Amendment, the Second Circuit has also used the SMRs to 
support the finding that promoting basic prison hygiene and health is a duty 
of prison authorities.231 Numerous district courts have also referenced the 
SMRs to allow prisoners’ claims regarding unconstitutional treatment to 
proceed232 and to review the use of solitary confinement in prison.233 Another 
court referenced the SMRs to provide injunctive relief improving the 
recreational programming available in a county jail.234 Finally, state supreme 
courts have used the SMRs to protect prisoners from cross-gender pat-down 
searches, 235  review the due process requirements in prison disciplinary 
proceedings,236 and determine acceptable dimensions for prison cell size in 
the absence of any cognizable federal or state standard.237 
Because the SMRs represent the international consensus on strip-
searching prisoners,238 the document can guide the domestic constitutional 
conversation forward after decades of stagnation. Rule 52 of the revised 
SMRs is the most on point. The rule clearly defines prisoners’ rights to 
bodily privacy in relation to strip searches. In relevant part, it reads: 
“intrusive searches, including strip and body cavity searches, should be 
undertaken only if absolutely necessary. Prison administrations shall be 
encouraged to develop and use appropriate alternatives to intrusive searches. 
 
 230 Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 107 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 n.8); see 
also Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1193–94 (D. Conn. 1980) (finding that “institutionalized 
overcrowding” of prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment), aff’d in part and modified and remanded 
in part, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 231 Morgan v. LaVallee, 526 F.2d 221, 225–26 n.8 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 232 Williams v. Coughlin, 875 F. Supp. 1004, 1012–13 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (listing cases). 
 233 United States v. D.W., 198 F. Supp. 3d 18, 143 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Solitary confinement shall be 
used only in exceptional cases as a last resort, for as short a time as possible and subject to independent 
review[.]” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting E.S.C. Res. 2015/20, at 17 (July 21, 2015)); see 
also Peoples v. Annucci, 180 F. Supp. 3d 294, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting the same provision). 
 234 Jones v. Wittenberg, 440 F. Supp. 60, 149 (N.D. Ohio 1977). 
 235 Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 131 (Or. 1981) (en banc). 
 236 Avant v. Clifford, 341 A.2d 629, 63738 (N.J. 1975). 
 237 Crain v. Bordenkircher, 342 S.E.2d 422, 446, 446 n.16 (W. Va. 1986). 
 238 In its own words, the revised SMRs give voice to “the general consensus of contemporary thought 
and the essential elements of the most adequate systems of today, to set out what is generally accepted as 
being good principles and practice in the treatment of prisoners.” G.A. Res. 70/175, supra note 38, at 7. 
At minimum, the revised SMRs “confirm an array of binding norms observed across UN member states.” 
Kasey McCall-Smith, United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson 
Mandela Rules), 55 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 1180, 1182 (2016); see also Dick, supra note 42, at 318 
(“There is a widespread acceptance of the Standard Minimum Rules on an international scale, which 
strengthens the proposition that these are forming recognizable and enforceable norms under [customary 
international law].”). 
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Intrusive searches shall be conducted in private.” 239 Lifting from Rule 52, 
there are three dimensions to protecting the right to bodily privacy: 
(1) prisons should require reasonable suspicion before conducting a search 
(which is how this Note interprets “absolutely necessary”); (2) prisons 
should use alternatives to strip searches whenever possible; and (3) prisons 
should conduct all nonemergency strip searches in private. All of these 
requirements can be feasibly applied in the domestic context and have local 
precedent. 
1. Requiring Reasonable Suspicion Before Conducting a  
Strip Search 
First, strip searches should be conducted only if absolutely necessary. 
This Note argues that, as applied in the domestic context, Rule 52 would 
require reasonable suspicion. The SMRs posit strips searches as an 
exception, not a daily practice, 240  and therefore limit their use to where 
“absolutely necessary.” Though necessity could be read as requiring 
probable cause, such a conclusion would be inconsistent with Bell, where the 
Court explicitly held that strip searches could be constitutionally conducted 
in the absence of probable cause.241 Furthermore, the European Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment has also read Rule 52’s “absolutely necessary” language to 
require individualized suspicion and has mandated individualized suspicion 
in its own standards. 242  As such, reasonable suspicion is a plausible 
approximation of what “absolutely necessary” means in practice. This Note 
is not arguing that reasonable suspicion is per se interchangeable with 
absolute necessity, or that such a rendering of reasonable suspicion is 
appropriate in nonprison strip-search contexts, such as searches incident to 
arrest. It is merely stating that, in applying the SMRs to the United States, 
reasonable suspicion translates the necessity contemplated by the 
international consensus and imports it to a domestic context without running 
afoul of prior Supreme Court precedent in Bell. 
Ending the debate over the level of cause by requiring reasonable 
suspicion would not be particularly earth-shattering—such a standard is 
already used by other domestic authorities that conduct strip searches, such 
 
 239 G.A. Res. 70/175, supra note 38, at 18–19. 
 240 See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
 241 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979). 
 242 COUNCIL OF EUR., REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS ON THE VISIT TO THE 
NETHERLANDS CARRIED OUT BY THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND 
INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (CPT) FROM 2 TO 13 MAY 2016, at 46 (2016), 
https://rm.coe.int/16806ebb7c [https://perma.cc/TXU6-6UTR]. 
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as Immigration Customs and Enforcement,243 the U.S. Marshals Service,244 
and others. 245  The American Correctional Association, in an expert 
opinion, 246  along with the American Jail Association, National Sheriffs’ 
Association, National Institute of Corrections of the Department of Justice, 
and Federal Bureau of Prisons, has also come out against conducting strip 
searches in the absence of reasonable suspicion. 247  Furthermore, at least 
sixteen states forbid conducting strip searches of minor offenders in the 
absence of reasonable suspicion. 248  That other authorities hold this 
standard—as well as the fact that many lower courts have argued for it—
 
 243  See ICE/DRO DETENTION STANDARD: SEARCHES OF DETAINEES 1 (2008), 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/detention-standards/pdf/searches_of_detainees.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
D987-DJBN]; ICE/DRO DETENTION STANDARD: ADMISSION AND RELEASE 4–5 (2008), 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/detention-standards/doc/admission_and_release.doc [https://perma.cc/ 
3X4J-CSXD]. 
 244  See U.S. MARSHALS SERV., POLICY DIRECTIVE, PRISONER CUSTODY-BODY SEARCHES 
§ 9.1(E)(3)(2010), https://web.archive.org/web/20120921011535/http://www.usmarshals.gov/foia/Direc
tives-Policy/prisoner_ops/body_searches.pdf [https://perma.cc/VL9F-A3AG]. 
 245 The Bureau of Indian Affairs requires an even higher standard than reasonable suspicion to justify 
a strip search. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFS., OFF. OF JUST. SERVS., THE DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS 
CORRECTIONS. HANDBOOK 211–12 (2012), https://govtribe.com/file/government-file/140a1619q0230-
bia-ojs-corrections-handbook-5-31-12-04-dot-pdf [https://perma.cc/8S9P-FUEG]. 
 246  See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 540 (2011) (“[E]xpert opinion may be relevant when 
determining what is obtainable and what is acceptable in corrections philosophy.”). 
 247 AM. CORR. ASS’N, THE AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION (ACA) PERFORMANCE-BASED 
STANDARDS FOR ADULT LOCAL DETENTION FACILITIES 4-ALDF-2C-03 (4th ed. 2004); U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., FEDERAL PERFORMANCE-BASED DETENTION STANDARDS HANDBOOK § C.6 (2d ed. 2011), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ofdt/fpbds02232011.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4K6-LRRS]; ACA, CORE 
JAIL STANDARDS § 1-CORE-2C-02 (2010), http://correction.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Core-Jail-
Standards-as-printed-June-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DLH-ZD5T]; MORRIS L. THIGPEN, LARRY 
SOLOMON, VIRGINIA A. HUTCHINSON & ALAN L. RICHARDSON, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., RESOURCE GUIDE FOR JAIL ADMINISTRATORS 113 (2004), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/020030.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6LB-RVCN]; 
MORRIS L. THIGPEN, LARRY SOLOMON, VIRGINIA A. HUTCHINSON & JIM T. BARBEE, NAT’L INST. OF 
CORR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SHERRIFF’S GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE JAIL OPERATIONS 50 (2007), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/021925.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YXV-4C2D]. 
 248 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 4030(f) (West 2020) (requiring reasonable suspicion); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 16-3-405(1) (2020) (requiring reasonable belief); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-33l(a) (2012) (same); 
FLA. STAT. § 901.211(2) (2020) (requiring probable cause); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/103-1(c) (2021) 
(requiring reasonable belief); IOWA CODE § 804.30 (2018) (requiring probable cause); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 22-2521(a) (2007) (same); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 764.25a(2) (2020) (requiring reasonable cause); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 544.193.2 (2011) (requiring probable cause); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:161A-1(b) (2020) 
(same); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2933.32(B)(2) (West 2019–2020) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-
119(b) (2020) (requiring reasonable belief); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-59.1(A) (2020) (requiring reasonable 
cause); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.79.130(1) (1986) (requiring reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause); 501 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 7:120(b) (2011) (requiring reasonable suspicion); 26-239-001 ME. CODE 
R. § II(1)(B) (LexisNexis 2020) (same). 
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means that such a standard is readily administrable by detention facilities.249 
Incorporating reasonable suspicion as part of the Fourth Amendment’s 
application to strip searches would be consistent with both international and 
domestic authorities. 
Reasonable suspicion can admittedly reproduce certain biases and 
perpetuate injustice. Because it is an inherently discretionary standard, 
reasonable suspicion can allow individual officers’ prejudices to manifest as 
they make case-by-case assessments of whether to strip-search a prisoner.250 
Like searches conducted outside of prison, the impact can fall 
disproportionately on minorities.251 For example, a study conducted over a 
year in a London police station found incidences of bias when tracking which 
arrestees officers viewed as being suspicious enough to strip-searchAfro-
Caribbean detainees were twice as likely to be searched as their white 
counterparts, even when controlling for sex, age, and level of offense.252 
Although conceding this downside to the reasonable suspicion 
standard, the potential for bias is not entirely unfettered. Reasonable 
suspicion requires that an official conducting a strip search “point to specific 
objective facts and rational inferences that they are entitled to draw from 
those facts in light of their experience.”253 As such, an official must offer 
some nondiscriminatory explanation for a search,254 and, if he fails to, a 
prisoner can use the absence of an explanation as evidence of bias. Moreover, 
such a standard will lessen the number of searches conducted, which is 
 
 249 Professor Donahoe raised this argument concerning the feasibility of adopting a reasonability 
standard in her article, discussed earlier in this Note. See Donahoe, supra note 123, at 584; see also supra 
Part II. 
 250 Indeed, the Third Circuit noted potential for abuse under reasonable suspicion as part of its 
rationale to uphold the blanket search in Florence. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 296, 
310 (3d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 566 U.S. 318 (2012). 
 251 Ha, supra note 22, at 2758 (“Research shows that giving police officers discretion to conduct strip 
searches may increase the chance of racial, gender, ethnic, or other forms of discrimination.”); see also 
André Keeton, Strip Searching in the Age of Colorblind Racism: The Disparate Impact of Florence v. 
Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 55, 55–56 (2015) 
(noting that the Court’s “phenomenal lapse” in the Florence holding disproportionately subjects 
minorities to harassment and humiliation at the hands of law enforcement). 
 252 Tim Newburn, Michael Shiner & Stephanie Hayman, Race, Crime and Injustice? Strip Search 
and the Treatment of Suspects in Custody, 44 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 677, 689 (2004). 
 253 Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668, 674 (8th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added). 
 254 United States v. Afanador, 567 F.2d 1325, 1329 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that a strip search was 
reasonable because it was based on the detailed testimony of a reliable informant); Hunter, 672 F.2d at 
675 (“Mere physical proximity to or association with another individual suspected of smuggling activity 
does not provide the independent basis necessary for intruding on the privacy of the strip search 
candidate.”); United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991, 995 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that merely 
matching a “profile” of a crime does not qualify as a reasonable suspicion justifying a strip search). 
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preferable to having this search happen to all detainees. Finally, even when 
bias manifests, the requirement to offer objective facts makes any 
discrimination more obvious, thus allowing plaintiffs to more easily file suit. 
At least with a uniform standard, victims of discrimination can more easily 
prove abnormal behavior deviating from the standard when bringing suit. 
Additionally, to help control for these biases and avoid inconsistent, ad 
hoc decision-making, detention facilities could use checklists to guide 
officers through analyzing reasonable suspicion. 255  Such checklists are 
already in use in multiple jurisdictions256 and consider factors such as “‘(1) 
the crime charged, (2) the particular characteristics of the arrestee . . . (3) the 
circumstances of the arrest,’ (4) the arrestee’s criminal record, (5) the effect 
of placing the detainee in the general prison population, and (6) the safety 
concerns raised by the detainee.” 257  The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
Department, for instance, lists the appearance of the arrestee or inmate, her 
behavior throughout the arrest and/or booking process, and other conduct 
suggesting she has contraband on her person as types of specific, objective 
facts that justify reasonable suspicion.258 A similar checklist from the Chapel 
Hill Police Department requires that officers satisfy one or more items before 
conducting a search; items include any information received from an 
informant suggesting the suspect is hiding evidence and the suspect’s prior 
criminal history, though the manual emphasizes that prior history alone 
cannot justify a search.259 When such checklists have only required officers 
to provide a rote list of generic reasons why they are choosing to search (such 
as in the case of stop and frisk), they have been less useful.260 To successfully 
eradicate bias from an evaluation of reasonable suspicion, checklists should 
 
 255  Donahoe, supra note 123, at 584 (noting the use of checklists in numerous jurisdictions to 
determine reasonable suspicion and suggesting that other jurisdictions adopt this practice). 
 256  L.A. CNTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, CUSTODY DIVISION MANUAL 5-08/010.00 Searches (2020), 
http://pars.lasd.org/Viewer/Manuals/14249/Content/13305 [https://perma.cc/TQ7N-RAX5]; CHAPEL 
HILL POLICE DEP’T, POLICY MANUAL 215–16 (2020), https://www.townofchapelhill.org/ 
home/showdocument?id=28619 [https://perma.cc/GV6K-U7GJ]; Brief of Current and Former Jail & 
Corrections Professionals as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 17–18, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen 
Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318 (2012) (No. 10-945) (noting the use of such a checklist among sheriffs in 
Indiana). 
 257 Donahoe, supra note 123, at 584 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 
796, 802 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
 258 L.A. CNTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, supra note 256. 
 259 CHAPEL HILL POLICE DEP’T, supra note 256, at 215–16. 
 260 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 581–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting how one officer 
who conducted many stops checked the same four boxes on 99% of his documentation forms and how 
another who conducted stops all over the city and throughout the day checked both “High Crime Area” 
and “Time of Day” on 75% of his forms). 
115:1737 (2021) The Fourth Amendment Stripped Bare 
1775 
require officers to provide a narrative for the basis of reasonable suspicion.261 
The checklists mentioned above do so because they require more details and 
do not rely on vague or subjective judgments. 
Real-life examples can further illustrate how the checklist factors are 
applied. For instance, applying factor (1), where a detainee has been charged 
with an inherently violent crime such as grand theft auto, the offense itself 
contributes to reasonable suspicion.262 This factor alone cannot justify the 
search but must be considered in tandem with other factors such as whether 
the detainee will be placed in the general population.263 Such a factor test can 
also lead prison officials to not conduct a search. For example, a detainee 
arrested for driving under the influence of drugs not expecting to be searched 
would likely not be concealing drug contraband in a body cavity.264 Absent 
the presence of another factor, such as safety concerns, an official would thus 
not be justified in conducting a strip search of this detainee.265 
2. Adopting Alternatives to Strip Searches 
Second, prisons should develop and use appropriate alternatives to strip 
searches.266 Reading the Fourth Amendment in light of Rule 52 delineates 
the extreme invasion of bodily privacy risked by strip searches and highlights 
why such an invasion should be the exception, rather than the rule. 
Alternatives to strip searches are available, effective, and already in use in 
domestic prisons. For example, body scanners can search a person’s body 
for the presence of contraband in a less intrusive manner, and they already 
exist in certain detention facilities around the country.267 In fact, SecurPass, 
a type of body scanner, can find weapons and drugs hidden deep within a 
 
 261 See id. at 559–60. 
 262 Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 263 Id. 
 264 Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1426 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 265 Id. 
 266 Scholars have previously discussed this solution, though not based on the persuasive rationale of 
using international norms. See Fenton, supra note 176, at 188 (arguing for the use of “valid alternatives 
to blanket strip search policies” such as “an adequate patdown search [that] would reveal weapons that 
might be concealed, satisfying the primary safety concern of the government” and “the use of metal 
detectors, which would reveal any concealed weapons that the patdown did not reveal”); McMath, supra 
note 71, at 750 (“Body cavity searches are not justified if there exist alternative means such as closer 
supervision or metal detector searches that better insure prison security and intrude less on prisoners’ 
rights.”); Cosey, supra note 123, at 550 (noting the availability of alternatives to strip searches that can 
maintain safety while burdening prisoners’ Fourth Amendment rights less). 
 267  Elaine Pittman, County Jails Deploy Whole-Body Scanners to Detect Hidden Weapons or 
Contraband, GOV’T TECH. (Apr. 27, 2011), https://www.govtech.com/public-safety/County-Jails-
Deploy-Whole-Body-Scanners.html [https://perma.cc/29TN-97GZ] (noting the use of body scanners at 
Illinois’s Cook County Jail and Florida’s Collier County Sheriff’s Office). 
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body cavity, beyond what the human eye can locate in a strip search.268 Not 
only is this alternative more effective at uncovering contraband than strip 
searches, it also costs around $125,000 per machine—a fraction of the 
millions 269  cumulatively paid out by cities and counties in after-the-fact 
litigation challenging the constitutionality of such searches. 270  Other 
alternatives that are already in use include pat-down searches, metal 
detectors, and the Body Orifice Screening System (BOSS) chair.271 These too 
are more successful at finding metal objects inside a detainee’s body orifices 
than a strip search.272 That these alternatives exist in facilities across the 
country proves that they are easily adoptable and administrable. By adhering 
to the standards in the SMRs, jails would be encouraged to implement the 
use of these body scanners and other means of searching for contraband. 
These alternatives to an invasive and degrading strip search not only preserve 
prisoners’ dignity, but also help law enforcement be more effective and 
avoid taxpayer-funded litigation and costly settlements. 
The issue does not appear to be the lack of available alternatives but 
rather some jails’ stubborn refusal to adopt them. For example, alternatives 
such as “(1) pat frisking all inmates; (2) making inmates go through metal 
detectors . . . ; (3) making inmates shower and use particular delousing 
agents or bathing supplies; and (4) searching inmates’ clothing” were all 
available in one of the defendant facilities in Florence, yet the majority 
opinion offered no reason as to why these alternatives should not have been 
used.273 Similarly, in Bell, the Court rejected using a metal detector because 
it could only identify weapons, not nonmetal contraband (i.e., money and 
drugs).274 The opinion failed to note, however, that additional alternatives, 
perhaps used in tandem, could identify nonmetal contraband, such as a pat-
 
 268 Erin Hicks, SecurPass Allows for Full Body Cavity Imaging, CORRECTIONS1 (Aug. 16, 2011), 
https://www.corrections1.com/products/medical-supplies/articles/securpass-allows-for-full-body-
cavity-imaging-nrghv3GozOflzlCQ/ [https://perma.cc/WUB3-M6SL]. 
 269 Schlanger, supra note 24, at 87. 
 270 Id.; see also STEVEN SINCLAIR & ROBERT HERZOG, A REVIEW OF FULL BODY SCANNERS: AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO STRIP SEARCHES OF INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS (2017), https:// 
app.leg.wa.gov/ReportsToTheLegislature/Home/GetPDF?fileName=Body%20Scanners%20Report%20
2017%20%28002%29_9de3196e-0867-4f78-97ae-343f923e1c45.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BBR-8252]. 
 271 Brief for the Petitioner at 5–6, 39, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318 (2012) 
(No. 10-945). 
 272 Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 16, Florence, 566 U.S. 318 (No. 10-945) (noting that a BOSS 
chair is often just as successful at detecting contraband as a strip search). 
 273 Florence, 566 U.S. at 348 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Levoy v. Mills, 788 F.2d 1437, 1439 
(10th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he government must demonstrate a legitimate need to conduct such a search and 
that less intrusive measures would not satisfy that need.”). 
 274 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 n.40 (1979). 
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down search combined with making inmates shower and searching their 
clothing. In fact, such “layered” approaches combining various types of 
searches are thought to be even more comprehensive than a single strip 
search alone.275 And, as previously stated, a body scanner could identify both 
metal and nonmetal contraband. 276  Justice Marshall’s dissent in Bell 
accordingly took issue with the majority’s “eschew[ing] consideration of less 
restrictive alternatives.”277 
The Court has noted that, when infringing upon prisoners’ 
constitutional rights, prisons do not have to opt for the “least restrictive 
alternative.”278 But if an easy, less intrusive alternative is readily available, it 
can provide evidence that the challenged action is an “‘exaggerated 
response’ to prison concerns.”279 Less intrusive alternatives have long existed 
but have not been given their proper due. Rule 52 would reverse that trend 
and guide courts to take these alternatives more seriously as opposed to 
readily deferring to prison officials. 
3. Conducting Strip Searches in Private 
Third, prisons should conduct searches in private.280 This final prong of 
Rule 52 recognizes that the invasion of privacy inherent in a strip search 
should be as limited as possible. The domestic conversation, however, has 
been markedly more inconsistent. Some courts have held that searches 
conducted in the presence of more prisoners or officers than necessary 
violate the Fourth Amendment.281 These courts have accordingly highlighted 
 
 275  Rachel Zoch, 3 Ways to Keep Contraband Under Control with Detection Technology, 
CORRECTIONS1 (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.corrections1.com/products/facility-products/body-
scanners/articles/3-ways-to-keep-contraband-under-control-with-detection-technology-sJUOpxnwH0B 
M9GDH/ [https://perma.cc/SX2T-V7MW] (“When you use varied methods [for searching inmates] . . . 
you have a complete screening solution.”). 
 276 Id. 
 277 441 U.S. at 565 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 278 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90–91 (1987). If required to always use the “least restrictive 
alternative,” prison administrators would have to “set up and then shoot down every conceivable 
alternative method of accommodating” prisoners’ rights. Id. 
 279 Id. at 90. 
 280 This solution has been previously proposed on noninternational-norm-based grounds. See Kenzie 
Ryback, Dear PrisonersBe Prepared to Be Gawked at: Other Prisoners Watching You Strip Naked Is 
Reasonably Related to Penological Interests, or Is It?, 123 PENN ST. L. REV. 839, 86265 (2019) 
(suggesting that the Court adopt the “less invasive alternative” test to analyze the reasonability of group 
strip searches and guide lower courts to find such searches unconstitutional where a private-search option 
is readily available). 
 281 See Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 574 (6th Cir. 2013) (finding strip search 
unreasonable in part because of its nonprivate nature); Abshire v. Walls, 830 F.2d 1277, 1280 (4th Cir. 
1987) (finding the presence of an additional six to eight officers during a strip search of a detainee a factor 
raising the question of the reasonableness of the strip search); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394–95 (10th 
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the private nature of a search, conducted by one to two officers with the 
prisoner alone, as a factor making the search reasonable.282 Other courts, 
however, have reached the opposite conclusion.283 Holding fast to Rule 52’s 
requirement of private searches would end this inconsistent decision-making 
and introduce uniformity across the circuits in-line with international 
consensus. 
Requiring private searches would be easily administrable in the 
domestic context, as evidenced by the fact that it is already in place in certain 
facilities.284 Officials can strip-search prisoners one at a time in a closed-off 
area or even place partitions between prisoners when they are being searched 
en masse. 285  Such partitions are used in multiple prisons nationwide. 286 
Moreover, adherence to private searches does not have to come without 
exceptions. Multiple courts, including those that have found group strip 
searches to be unreasonable, have allowed for group searches when an 
emergency like a prison riot occurs. 287  But in day-to-day situations, the 
Fourth Amendment right to bodily privacy should protect against a group 
strip search. By incorporating the right to a private search as part of the 
application of the Fourth Amendment, there would be consistency in the 
 
Cir. 1984) (noting that the conducting of a strip search in a public area where an additional ten to twelve 
people were present contributed to making the search unconstitutional). 
 282 See Stanley v. Henson, 337 F.3d 961, 965 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Justice v. City of Peachtree 
City, 961 F.2d 188, 193 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding search minimally intrusive because it was private, 
although it was in front of two officers); Dufrin v. Spreen, 712 F.2d 1084, 1087 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding 
search not improper in part because conducted in private by one female attendant). 
 283 See Sumpter v. Wayne County, 868 F.3d 473, 485 (6th Cir. 2017) (upholding a facility’s practice 
of strip-searching five prisoners at a time because of the expediency offered by a group search); 
Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 697, 701 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding as reasonable the strip search of 
a prisoner in front of multiple other prisoners). 
 284 See, e.g., Young v. County of Cook, 616 F. Supp. 2d 834, 840 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (noting that women 
were strip-searched in cubicles and could not see individuals in other cubicles); Williams v. City of 
Cleveland, 907 F.3d 924, 938–39 (6th Cir. 2018) (White, J., dissenting), reh’g denied, 2018 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 34594 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2018). 
 285 See Williams v. City of Cleveland, 210 F. Supp. 3d 897, 907 (N.D. Ohio 2016) (noting that a 
prison administrator “admitted that, while it may ‘slow things down just a little bit,’ detainees could easily 
be strip-searched individually versus as part of a group”), rev’d and remanded, 907 F.3d 924 (6th Cir. 
2018), reh’g denied, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 34594 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2018). 
 286 Young, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 840 (noting that defendant’s expert did not know of any jails in the 
past twenty years that had carried out group strip searches without using a privacy partition); Williams, 
907 F.3d at 938–39 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that the Ohio Corrections Officer Basic Training 
Manual states that the use of “modesty panels” in group searches indicates good faith to carry out a search 
in a constitutional manner). 
 287 Williams v. City of Cleveland, 771 F.3d 945, 954 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Florence v. Bd. of 
Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 327 (2012)) (suggesting allowing group searches where circumstances 
are “unusually dire”); Sumpter v. Wayne County, 868 F.3d 473, 498 (6th Cir. 2017) (Clay, J., dissenting); 
Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 573–74 (6th Cir. 2013). 
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treatment of prisoners in line with internationally accepted standards of 
human dignity. 
CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Amendment does not simply vanish when confronting the 
specter of maintaining jail security. By looking to international customary 
law in the form of Rule 52, courts can consistently define the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment as applied to prisoners’ bodily privacy. This will help 
resolve disputes that have plagued the Court and lower courts for decades, 
from Bell to Florence. Courts should do this not only because the SMRs 
represent the consensus of nations, but also because they are the product of 
careful research and debate. Adoption of Rule 52’s standard would stem the 
flow of inconsistent decisions, thereby preserving prisoners’ dignity and 
human rights. If the above standards were applied, the abusive strip search 
of Deanna Jones—whose arrest for a minor offender raised no suspicion—
would not have happened. As a “minimum standard,” the SMRs do not end 
the debate, but rather guide the conversation out of the morass in which it 
has been stuck for decades. As “a floor, not a statement of excellence,”288 the 




 288 Peirce, supra note 142, at 295. 
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